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Abstract
Pro-independence parties in Catalonia and Scotland have for years 
claimed their determination to hold a referendum on the political future of 
the regions. Their commitment to channel their secession demands through 
a referendum had been realized, yet their secession attempts were frustrated. 
Despite multiple commonalities between these two cases, including the fact 
that in neither case is there a constitutional right to decide, there is a striking 
difference: a state response. 
The Spanish government refused the Catalan government’s 
proposal to delegate powers for the holdings of the independence 
referendum and has forcefully reacted to the unconstitutional referendums 
held in 2014 and 2017, perpetuating its rigid and fierce position on 
referendums and independence. On the contrary, the UK government 
responded to a similar proposal cooperatively. The UK and Scottish 
governments agreed on the delegation of powers to hold a legally binding 
referendum on independence, thereby establishing the legal basis for the
Scottish independence referendum held in 2014. Though regional 
governments run by pro-independence parties had proceeded with a similar 
procedure for the holdings of the referendum, what were the determinants to 
variations in state responses?
I, therefore, seek to explain variations in state responses to the 
demands of an independence referendum by nationalist regional parties. 
With a focus on parties’ electoral logic of behavior before and after the 
independence referendum, I argue that the party strategies factor is the most 
crucial element explaining variations in state responses in Catalonia and 
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Scotland. From case-centered empirical studies, I found that ruling party 
elites do behave strategically on the issue of the independence referendum 
for their own rational goals. In other words, ruling parties and party elites 
utilize the independence issue to retain further and expand their share of the 
vote in upcoming elections.
Keywords: Independence referendum, secession, party strategy, 
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On September 18, 2014, the Scots turned to the ballots to decide 
their future relationship with the United Kingdom after through the 
Edinburgh Agreement of 2012 had devolved a right to decide, or a right to 
self-determination, to the Scottish government.1 During the lead-up, both 
campaigns in favor of and against Scottish independence mobilized millions 
of people, with town hall meetings and discussions participated by most of 
the electorate happening alongside. The independence referendum, with the 
highest turnout rates (84.6%) in its election history, posed the question of 
the independence as 55.3% of those who voted chose to stay in the union. 
Simultaneously in Catalonia, political elites have for years been seeking for 
‘right to decide.’ They have mobilized fiercely through scathing political 
rhetoric and massive street demonstrations, in the battle against the firm 
Spanish government in Madrid, as well as the rigid Supreme Court, a 
“highly politicized institution” (Morata 2013: 281). On 1 October 2017, the 
non-binding referendum or “consultation.” 2 The referendum on 
Independence for Catalonia had an overwhelming majority (92%) that voted 
for ‘yes,’ but its low turnout rates (43%) have questioned its legitimacy. In 
neither case, did an independence referendum lead to secession, confirming 
                                           
1
The right to decide was devolved to the Scottish government for a fixed period, before 
the end of 2014 to allow a single question referendum on its independence to be held (HM 
Government and Scottish Government 2012).
2 The Spanish government had declared that any independence referendum would be 
illegal. The Catalan government, therefore, avoided using the term “referendum” and favor 
“consultation” or “process of citizens’ participation” instead. By contrast, the UK and 
Scottish government signed an agreement on the parameters of the 2014 referendum, 
explicitly acknowledging the legality of the referendum.
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Stéphane Dion's statement that “secessionists never managed to split a well-
established democracy through a referendum or an electoral victory (Dion 
1996: 270).”
Catalonia and Scotland portray very similar pictures. The main 
characteristics they have in common are that they all have a strong sense of 
regional identity and a long history as distinct nations; they have similar 
devolved systems; they are all part of the EU; they all have influential 
nationalist parties representing their interests; and in neither case, is there a 
constitutional right to decide. Despite these multiple commonalities between 
these two cases, there is a striking difference: a state response. The Spanish 
government refused the Catalan government's proposal to delegate powers 
for the holdings of the independence referendum and has forcefully reacted 
to the unconstitutional referendums held in 2014 and 2017, indicating its 
rigid and fierce position on referendums and independence. Meanwhile, the 
UK and Scottish governments agreed on the delegation of powers to hold a 
legally binding referendum on independence, thereby establishing the legal 
basis for the Scottish independence referendum held in 2014. Therefore, a 
question emerges: Though regional governments run by pro-independence 
parties had proceeded with a similar procedure for the holdings of the 
referendum, what were the determinants to variations in state responses?
This paper addresses territorial party politics about frustrated 
secessions in plurinational democracies. As other secessionist movements in
other democracies have or have tried, both secessionist movements used a 
means of popular consultation, by which the decision on secession is 
dependent upon the will of the people of the region3 In this respect, I argue 
that establishing a legal basis and formalities for independence referendums 
                                           
3 For instance, Quebec.
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is an essential step in the secessionist movement. More importantly, the fact 
that the Scottish government had ‘obtained’ the legal basis for the 
referendum, while the Catalan had not, requires special attention for 
thorough academic research.  
To get a deeper understanding of how a secessionist project unfolds 
in established democracies, I, therefore, seek to explain variations in state 
responses to the demands for an independence referendum in Catalonia and 
Scotland. I hypothesize that ruling party elites do behave strategically on the 
issue of the independence referendum for their own strategic and rational 
goals. In other words, ruling parties and party elites will utilize the 
independence issue to retain further and expand their share of the vote in 
upcoming elections.
2. Goal
Independence referendums are rare events in established 
democracies. Such a referendum is a historic moment for a political 
community, which must choose between status quo and independence. Also, 
it is a momentous event for a nationalist mobilization process, in which 
communities are actively engaged in public discourse, collective actions 
such as rallies and demonstrations, and decision-making (Lecours 2018). 
Nationalist mobilization succeeded in both cases, and that makes these cases 
intriguing and unique. Moreover, for researchers studying Catalan and 
Scottish secessionist movements characterized by their contrasting 
trajectories will be able to provide theoretical implications in the general 
understanding of secessionism in established democracies. These cases may 
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also have repercussions on nascent secessionist movements all over the 
continent, 4 be a trigger for or a dissuasion from arranging another 
independence referendum. 
Most importantly, this contribution aims to examine the saliency of 
electoral strategies, put it differently that of electoral competition, behind 
the central government's reaction to the referendum on independence. This 
analysis abandons the most oft-noted topic in secession literature, which is 
mass mobilization for social movements. Instead, it attempts to focus on the 
behaviors of ruling parties in the context of territorial politics. Moreover, 
while identifying in neither case is there a constitutional right to self-
determination, I deny such institutional explanations, instead, suggest an 
actor-oriented account in that I emphasize the electoral strategies of the 
ruling parties in the central governments had an impact on the presence or 
absence of the resisted independence referendum. By doing so, I hope to 
provide an analytical explanation for secessionism in established 
democracies and the logics of partisan action on secession.
3. Scope and method
I adopt a most similar system (MSS) design to explain variations in 
state responses to the demands for independence in Catalonia and Scotland. 
The MSS approach enables us to identify differences through the selection 
of cases with similarities; “common systemic characteristics are conceived 
                                           
4 There have been rising nationalism in the UK (Wales, Scotland, and Northern Island), 
Belgium (Flanders and Wallonia), Germany (Bavaria), France (Brittany and Corsica), Spain 
(the Basque Country and Catalonia), Italy (South Tyrol, Sicily, Lombardy, and Veneto), 
Czech Republic (Moravia) and the list goes on (Guardian 2017).
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of as ‘controlled for,’ whereas intersystemic differences are viewed as 
explanatory variables. The number of common characteristics sought is 
maximal, and the number of not shared characteristics sought, minimal 
(Przeworski and Teune 1970: 33).” Following MSS design, Spain and the 
UK are a common comparison in the literature on nationalism and territorial 
politics (e.g., Keating 2001; Guibernau 2006; Swenden 2006; Guibernau et 
al. 2014; Cetra and Harvey 2018). Catalonia and Scotland have many 
similarities. As aforementioned, they all have a strong sense of regional 
identity; they have similar devolved systems; they are all part of the EU; 
they all have influential nationalist parties representing their interests; and in 
neither case, is there a constitutional right to self-determination.
Further, it is worth noting that ultimately, these two referendums' 
results were contrasting, which can be interpreted in that the Catalan 
referendum should have brought independence to the people of Catalonia. I 
argue the result of the referendums does not overtly impact my hypothesis to 
the point of making it illegitimate, but rather to the point of making it valid. 
The voting turnout was low as 43% in Catalonia, whereas the ‘yes’ vote 
counted for over 90%. This low figure can be explained by the fierce 
position of the central government in Madrid, arousing fear and indifference 
amongst the people of Catalan towards the independence referendum and 
independence per se. In this light, I argue variations in state responses in the 
two cases is an important research topic.
Since this study focuses on the variations in state responses to the 
territorial demands, I selected specific timeframes for the case comparison 
analysis. In the Catalan case, I focus on the Spanish government’s refusal to 
delegate powers to hold a referendum in Catalonia in 2014, which led to the 
holdings of non-binding independence referendum twice and the unilateral 
11
declaration of independence of Catalonia. To investigate the party dynamics 
and the behavior of ruling parties, I pay special attention to the period of 
2010-2015, before and after the Spanish government’s refusal to the 
delegation of powers. In the Scottish case, I focus on the agreement between 
the UK and Scottish government, what became known as the Edinburgh 
Agreement of 2012, which set formalities of the independence referendum 
held in 2014. I, therefore, center on the period of 2011-2015, before and 
after the Edinburgh Agreement.
In the next chapter, I will discuss the relevant literature for this 
analysis. It considers the case studies and scholarly viewpoint that are 
relevant to the topic of the analysis. Chapter Three shall establish the 
theoretical framework, in which two case comparisons are to be considered. 
Chapter Four shall discuss the backgrounds of the Catalan and Scottish 
secessionist movements. First, it will briefly introduce the devolved systems 
of Catalonia and Scotland, by which the electoral structure has become 
complexed, and subsequently, political parties have adapted to this 
dispensation, by changing their internal organizational structures. Second, it 
will encapsulate the road to independence referendums in these two cases so 
that one can distinguish the difference between the two.
Chapter Five and Six use an explaining-outcome process-tracing 
method (Beach and Pederson 2013) to study the critical determinants to 
variations in state responses to the territorial demands in Catalonia and 
Scotland while paying special attention to the behavior of political parties. 
According to Beach and Pederson, the explaining-outcome process-tracing 
method is used in a case-centric analysis to craft (minimally) sufficient 
explanation of the outcome for a particular case. Further, it may use both 
deductive and inductive methods using empirical evidence, combining these 
12
two into a complex conglomerate mechanism to account for a historical 
outcome. I therefore test an existing explanation(institutional), then move on 
to the inductive part, building a plausible alternative explanation (actor-
oriented) based on the evidence gathered from a multitude of different 
sources. 
The sources used to feed process-tracing include archival sources, 
such as constitutions or conventions, election manifestos, the White Papers, 
an official report of the parliament, and election results, as well as existing 
scholarship. Also, census survey data collected by the Centre d'Estudis 
d'Opinió (CEO) and Scottish Social Attitudes (SSA), as well as news article 
records of the secessionist movement, are used to examine the regional 
populations of preferences to independence.
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II. Literature Review
1. Demands for independence: rise of secessionism
The importance of Catalan and Scottish secessionism was 
recognized in the literature. Many researchers have approached in various 
ways to explain reasons why demands for independence recently arose in 
the regions, while some have focused on the expected political or economic 
consequences of secession (e.g., Armstrong and Ebell 2014; Castells 2014; 
Lecours 2018). In this section, I will focus on the former as it provides an 
insightful analysis in the understanding of a change in voter preference on 
the territorial question. Existing explanations on the emergence of 
secessionism in Catalan and Scottish communities primarily point to 
national identity, dire economic circumstances, and desire for political 
recognition.
The national identity account intersects with nationalism studies, in 
that it points to an increasing attachment to the regional identity as the 
underpinning of civic nationalism or the “nations without state nationalism”
(Keating 1996; Guibernau 1999). Plurinational democracies can be 
characterized by the phrase ‘one polity and several demoi' (Requejo 2013: 
159), and identity becomes more involved in plurinational contexts than in 
mononational. There are two types of nationalism, appealing to the same 
population of a given territory; while state nationalism seeks to promote a 
shared national identity for all the citizens for the state, the nations without 
state nationalism seeks recognition as a demos, claiming a right to self-
government and self-determination (Kymlicka and Norman 1995: 306). As a 
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result, dual identities are in play and compete against each other, and 
citizens can feel attached to both the regional and the state identity with 
different intensities (Serrano 2013: 527).5 Thus, it can be assumed that 
secession is on the cards when the ethnoterritorial identity is shared by the 
majority of the population. 
Many researchers in this tradition contend that the stronger 
attachment to regional identity than to state identity explains popular 
support for independence in the regions, but starting from the different 
understandings of the concept of identity. Researchers put a stronger 
emphasis on the social construction of national identity that privileges the 
territorial inclusion of demos over the ethnocultural one. For instance, the 
Scottish identity is based on “a sense of place,” rather than a “sense of tribe”
(Smout 1994). Similarly, Catalan identity is held to “include a collective 
will for self-government based on an inclusive conception of Catalanness” 
(Serrano 2013: 531). This territorially inclusive definition of identity was 
empirically proven as secessionist elites in both cases during their bid for 
independence (2012-2017) embraced multiple identities through the 
territorial inclusion of immigrants (Arrighi 2019). 
However, it cannot be assumed that national self-identification is 
the due product of culture or social construction; individuals can cognitively 
choose the sense of separate identity. According to Morata (2013: 285), 
researchers have found “the bonding of traditional identity feelings with 
more pragmatic attitudes, represented by younger generations, mostly 
descendants of Spanish immigrants of the 1950s and 1960s.” In his analysis 
                                           
5
This double allegiance has also been defined as compound, dual, split or nested identities 
(see Linz et al., 1981; Miller, 2000; Moreno, 2001).
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of data from CEO surveys, Burg (2015) argue that satisfaction with Catalan 
government performance is a reliable and statistically significant predictor 
of identity: “high confidence in Catalan political leadership increases and 
low confidence decreases, the probability of declaring either more or 
exclusively Catalan rather than equally Catalan-Spanish identity (296).”
The material account has appeared in the literature as often as the 
identity account. Many researchers emphasize dire economic circumstances 
due to government deficits and EU-led austerities since the 2008 financial 
crisis (e.g., Keating 2009; Guibernau 2013; Griffiths et al. 2015). With an 
increasing unemployment rate, even skyrocketed among under 24, and slow 
economic growth, Catalonia saw its wealth and status downgraded as it has 
lost resources and saving for infrastructure while accumulating an annual 
deficit of 8% of GDP due to the financial arrangement imposed by the 
Spanish Government in Madrid. Moreover, EU-led austerities fueled pro-
independence sentiment in Catalonia amid unease about the channeling of 
taxpayers’ money to more impoverished regions.6  
The last account to rising demands for independence in Catalonia 
and Scotland is the desire of political recognition. In this account, 
researchers point to emotions that trigger confrontation and struggles for 
greater recognition. They contend that government deficits or austerities 
alone do not attribute to minority nationalism, but a complex of 
ethnocultural and political-economic factors, such as a strong sense of 
regional identities, insufficient financial autonomy, linguistic and cultural 
                                           
6 Catalonia’s average contribution to the Spanish Central Administration and Social 
Security corresponds to 19.40% of the total, but Catalonia only received 14.03%. After 
contributing to Spain’s various funds based on the solidarity principle, Catalonia is worse 
off than those autonomous communities subsidized by the funds and finds itself below the 
average in per capita spending (Guibernau 2014: 17).
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distinctiveness, and the deepening of integration led by the European Union. 
Due to these reasons, minority nations would demand political (or symbolic) 
recognition and therefore, independence (Serrano 2013; Guibernau 2014; 
고주현 2018). Guibernau (2014) refers to the term emancipatory 
nationalism, a democratic type of nationalism emerging in nations who do 
not identify with the state nor feel politically and culturally recognized as 
nations by the state (7-8). Catalonia and Scotland are cases in point. Her 
simple point is that nations or parts of nations included within a larger state 
feel that they did not earn a certain degree of political recognition from the 
state they deserve of, and this understanding becomes a motive for an 
opposition movement in search for greater recognition for the nation it 
claims to represent.  
These three accounts provide a seminal insight into the 
understanding of increasing popular support for secessionism from the 
political, economic, and psychological perspectives. However, they 
neglected the crucial roles of political parties. Indeed, a complex interaction 
of actors is necessary for a secessionist movement to unfold and gain 
momentum. I seek to emphasize that political parties are present in almost in 
every aspect of the secessionist movement, such as mobilization, facilitation 
of discourses on independence, and legislation for the holdings of a 
referendum. In particular, political parties have played a crucial role in 
negotiating the legality and formalities of the referendum, which is an 
essential step in the Catalan and Scottish secessionist movements as these 
cases have employed a means of popular consultation.  
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2. Political parties in territorial reforms
Studies on territorial politics have emphasized political parties as 
vehicles of territorial reforms, including secession (e.g., Hepburn 2009; 
Muro 2009; Toubeau 2011; Toubeau and Massetti 2012; Rico and Liñeira 
2014). Following recent structural transformations resulting from European 
integration and decentralization, the territory has been brought back in 
(Keating 2008). Parties representing stateless nations and national minorities 
have taken advantage of the reshaping of political space by the European 
project, adapting to this new dispensation (Lynch 1996; De Winter and 
Gómez-Reino 2002; Keating 2004). To them, it has often implied a 
rethinking of the whole concept of independence and a shift to a post-
sovereign stance (Keating 2001).
As in the selected cases, the territorial dimension is at the basis of 
the representative functions of political parties. As “systems of 
channelment” (Sartori 1976), parties articulate distinct territorial interests or 
meditate between different territorial interests represented in their 
organization (Toubeau and Massetti 2012: 301). Once identified as 
‘peripheral parties’ in the early 1980s (Rokkan and Urwin 1983) and ‘ethnic 
parties’ in the 1990s (Lane et al. 1991), nationalist and regionalist parties 
(NRPs) have now become a permanent feature of the European political 
landscape (Hepburn 2009: 477).7 These parties exhibit a commitment to 
territorial empowerment, which distinguishes them from other party families. 
They seek to represent and advance the particular interests of the region and 
                                           
7 For the purpose of discussions, I use the term ‘nationalist and regionalist parties,' rather 
than ‘stateless nationalist and regionalist parties' introduced by Hepburn (2009).
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where regional (or territorial) interests may be economic, political, social, 
cultural, or symbolic (ibid.: 483). In other words, their core business is 
essentially the demand for self-government based on territorial identities 
and interests (De Winter and Türsan 1998). For instance, many NRPs in 
government have outlined proposals for radical constitutional change, such
as the Scottish National Party’s (SNP) and Junts pel Si’s commitment in 
secession for years.8
Some scholars have pointed to the process of political 
decentralization explained by looking at it as the rational act of political 
parties seeking to achieve electoral goals (O’Neill 2003; Leon 2006). Others 
have emphasized parties’ goals for the retention of electoral majorities 
(Meguid 2009; Sorens 2009). In a similar vein, Sonia Alonso (2012) 
emphasizes the competition between state parties and NRPs, which pushes 
some state parties to accommodate devolution at some point in time. In 
comparative studies of Belgium, Italy, Spain, and the UK, she further argues 
that when an NRP takes votes away from the state party in state elections in 
an electorally relevant region, in which the threatened state party has a high 
concentration of its total state-wide vote (53). For example, the devolution 
in the UK was possible, she explains, because the Labour was significantly 
threatened by the Scottish National Party (SNP) in Scotland and Plaid 
Cymru (PC) in Wales, while it was proportionally stronger in the Northern 
regions of England, Scotland and Wales (103). In the Spanish case, the 
Socialist Party were most influential in Andalusia and Catalonia, while it 
had to compete against the CiU in Catalonia and PNV in the Basque 
Country. Because CiU and PNV represented 19 percent of the total 
                                           
8 Junt Pel Si is a coalition party in Catalonia formed since the 2015 election between ERC 
and CDC, who are pro-independence parties.
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parliamentary seats in Spain and were strong enough to be a threat to state 
parties with government aspirations, the Socialist Party, therefore, 
accommodated devolution as its last-ditch effort. Further, she concludes that 
state parties use adversarial or accommodative strategies to the demands for 
devolution because there are always electoral benefits to reap from 
manipulating the center-periphery conflict in one or another state party's 
benefit (247).9
Overall, Alonso's analysis suggests that territorial reforms are at the 
heart of the amplified political scene where political parties manipulate and 
behave strategically for their own good. Alonso’s analysis has built a fertile 
ground for more comparative researches in establishing the theoretical 
perspective of party politics in territorial reforms and firmly stressing party 
elites’ manipulation of territorial issues. I argue this point to be relevant to 
my analysis as it paves the way for an essential theoretical perspective and, 
in so doing, nurtures the scholarly literature in the field of party behavior 
and territorial reforms.
Beyond Alonso, Cetrà and Harvey (2018) deal with another form of 
territorial reform, particularly secession. In an attempt to examine why the 
UK and Spanish governments reacted differently to the demands for 
independence, they suggest that the central governments responded within 
the framework of a constitutional right to self-determination and the 
conception of the state. More importantly, the PP-led Spanish government 
and the Conservatives-Liberal Democrat UK government did so strategically. 
Their novelty consists of the initiative in depicting the actor’s interest and 
preferences behind their decisions, which institutions and ideas alone do not 
                                           
9 Alonso (2012) uses terms anti-periphery and pro-periphery strategies, instead of 
adversarial and accommodative. For the purpose of discussion, I use the latter.
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explain. 
Their analysis on the differences between the Catalan and Scottish 
independence referendum, in pertinence with party politics, sheds light on 
the understanding of the roles of political parties, particularly the supply 
side, in secession. However, their analysis lacks thick explanations on the 
parties’ strategic calculation in the changing party political context as they 
have primarily focused on the relationship between institutional and 
ideational factors, and the strategic factor.10 Also, the role of party politics 
in politicizing and contesting the issue of secession has not been sufficiently 
explained. 
By reviewing the literature mentioned above, it becomes evident 
that the party political perspective is necessary for the understanding of 
territorial reforms. In this light, applying this theoretical perspective to the 
selected cases requires going beyond Alonso and Cetrà and Harvey. Since 
devolution, the electoral structures have been complexed, and parties had 
subsequently adapted their internal organizational structures to this new 
dispensation. In a multilevel environment, state-wide parties (SWP) play a 
function in securing the territorial integrity of the state by linking the 
various levels and territorial units (Fabre and Swenden 2013: 342), but at 
the same time, their regional branches do not. Instead, they position 
themselves and strategize on the territorial dimension as regional parties do. 
Moreover, especially when the climate of polarization characterizes public 
opinion on the ‘territorial question,’ in addition to stiff electoral 
competitions with other SWPs and NRPs, strategic calculations of SWPs 
                                           
10 Cetrà and Harvey (2018) contend that a constitutional right to self-determination and 
conceptions of state and nations have been used in the rhetoric of the ruling parties and as 
the reasons why they opted for resistance or accommodation to the demands for lawful 
independence referendums of pro-independence regional parties.
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become even more complicated. Thus, this paper aims to contribute to this 
emerging literature by capturing the behavior of state parties in such a party 
dynamic context, politicizing and contesting the issue of secession and reap 




Upon sifting through the pieces of literature provided, an 
interesting question emerges. Why do the research regarding the Catalan and 
Scottish secessionism not fully engage in navigating the supply side of 
independence, the states? It, in turn, creates an empirical gap which must be 
answered, and it will seek to address the gap with insights drawn from the 
territorial politics literature previously discussed.
I asked the question this thesis seeks to answer: “why were there 
variations in state responses to the demands for an independence referendum 
in Catalonia and Scotland?” I established a primary hypothesis that ruling 
party elites do behave strategically on the issue of an independence 
referendum for their own strategic and rational goals. I further elaborated in 
that I also argue that ruling parties and party elites utilize the independence 
issue to retain further and expand their share of the vote in upcoming 
elections.
In this light, this paper focuses on the behavior of ruling parties and 
party elites. For doing so, I focus on parties’ electoral logic of action 
(Toubeau and Massetti 2013: 302), along which political elites devise 
strategies following a set of interests and objectives. This logic captures the 
behavior of parties, which seeks in nature to maximize their share of the 
electoral market, which is anchored in Downs’ spatial theory (1957). 
Moreover, drawing from insights developed by territorial politics scholars 
(Meguid 2008; Hepburn 2009; Alonso 2012; Toubeau and Massetti 2012; 
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Cetrà and Harvey 2018), I have distinguished three relevant dimensions of 
partisan strategic incentives: first, the strategic calculation of ruling elites 
vis-à-vis incentives created by the party system; second, incentives created 
by the party competition; and third, incentives created by public opinion. 
2. Framework drawn from territorial politics
First, I start from the point where parties make strategic 
calculations vis-a-vis incentives from the bi-dimensional political systems in 
both cases. Political parties as vote-maximizers will adopt positions in both 
ideological and territorial dimensions whenever the situation requires it 
(Alonso 2012: 34). Researchers have empirically proved that many parties 
had changed their position opportunistically and instrumentally, repeatedly 
moving back and forth on the “territorial question” (Meguid 2008; Hepburn 
2010; Toubeau 2011). Examples for this repositioning of parties on the 
decentralization issue can be the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE), which 
moved from a Jacobin-centralist party to supporting the creation of Spanish 
autonomous communities (Moreno 2001) and similarly the British Labour 
Party, which was opposed to decentralization in the 1960s and became the 
primary instigator of devolution following the second referendum in 1997 
(Bradbury 2006). An example from NRPs is also available. The electorally 
successful regional party, Convergència i Unió, also moved from supporting 
decentralization to supporting independence since the 1990s. It is 
impossible to locate parties on a fixed and permanent point on the territorial 
dimension, De Winter and Türsan (1998) argued. It, therefore, underlines 
both SWPs and NRPs as strategic actors that target simultaneously more 
24
than one combination of social groups to maximize their electoral potential.
Second, I emphasize that incentives created by electoral 
competitions between NRPs, NRPs and SWPs, and SWPs have effects on 
the party strategies regarding territorial reforms, which have also 
continuously been studied in the territorial politics literature (e.g., Meguid 
2008; Alonso 2012; Martí Tomàs 2015). For the purpose of discussion, I 
will focus on the party competitions between NRPs and SWPs, and in 
between SWPs, which would have significant effects on the strategies of the 
ruling parties in the central governments, which is also one of the SWPs. 
According to Alonso (2012), SWPs have two main movements along the 
territorial dimension; they can either converge towards the issue position of 
the nationalist competitors or move away from it and closer to the centralist 
side of the dimension (37). The former is more likely when SWPs attempt to 
take voters away from the NRP by challenging the exclusivity of the party’s 
programmatic stance and only when the NRP directly threatens them. The 
latter is used by SWPs to attract voters whose preferences go against the 
proposals of NRPs and who give more relevance to territorial issues than to 
left-right position issues when deciding their vote.  
Third, I consider the views of the public on the territorial question, 
which create incentives for both NRPs and SWPs. From the point of view of 
ruling parties, the opinion polling provides them with a barometer that 
enables them to measure how large or small their support basis would be. It 
is important to note that if ruling parties can ascertain the public would 
reject independence their reaction, which strategy the parties would use 
would not make a difference, be it accommodative or adversarial. In this 
respect, I will consider public opinion as to the last important dimension of 
party incentives, as Cetrà and Harvey (2018) emphasize the same point.
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IV. Backgrounds of Catalan and Scottish Independence 
Movement
1. Devolution 
This section introduces the change in electoral party systems 
brought by devolution. Devolution in Spain and the UK has sparked the 
multi-level nature of party competition and party organization. 11 For 
general elections, state-wide parties (SWPs) devise a single electoral 
program that appeals to as large a group of voters as possible. For regional 
elections, they center on specific interests of each region because the issues 
discussed at the regional level may diverge from those discussed at the 
national level. This is because SWPs now face a competition with regional 
parties, or non-state-wide parties (e.g., Fabre 2008; Fabre and Swenden 
2013), which build their electoral appeal on regional identity, authority or 
territorial mobilization at the center and are likely to question the regional 
credentials of the SWPs (Meguid 2008; Toubeau 2011).
Moreover, SWPs are now under pressure between party unity, 
cohesion, and centralization on the one hand, and diversification and 
internal decentralization on the other hand (Fabre 2008: 309). As SWPs 
should compete in elections at different levels, electoral and party systems 
certainly influence their organizational structures. Caramani (2005: 315) 
                                           
11 More precisely, for the Spanish case, it is decentralization, which was achieved by the 
creation of seventeen Autonomous Communities (ACs). The decentralization proceeded 
through bilateral bargaining, which created the statute for autonomy for each AC, and, in so 
doing, created asymmetry in the decentralized powers from one community to another. 
Most serious was fiscal autonomy distributed to ACs, of which the 'foral' regimes were 
given the most, compared to other ACs. Due to the continuous grievances expressed by 
other ACs, especially the Basque Country and Catalonia, the fiscal system was revised three 
times, which yet turned out to be not much satisfactory.
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observed that “linguistic, territorial and ethnic cleavages that specifically
refer[ed] to the distinctiveness of the cultural and ethnic regions” had 
remained steady. Thus, at regional elections, SWPs need to aim primarily at 
defending the interests of the region, rather than the national community as 
the country (Keating and McGarry 2001).
In addition, the presence of nationalist parties puts more pressure 
on the internal cohesion of state-wide parties, as they emphasize different
issues and politicize the relationships between the central and regional levels
(Deschouwer, 2003; Hopkin and Bradbury 2006: 136). NRPs’ regionalized 
issue profile may prompt its party elites to demand more autonomy. They 
may argue that they are more legitimate than the SWPs and better 
understand the local and regional situations because they know better of the 
region than anybody else. As a matter of fact, this rhetoric was used by both 
CiU and the SNP when appealing for valence issue votes.
The interconnection between state-wide and regional elections also 
has effects on the internal organization of SWPs. The level of 
interconnection depends upon the electoral cycle, state-wide considerations 
on regional elections and the impact of regional elections on central 
government (Deschouwer 2003: 223). When the outcome of a regional 
election depends on the national context, or when regional elections 
influence national politics, SWPs are more likely to keep a certain level of 
control over their regional branches. On the contrary, when state-wide and 
regional elections are disconnected, the regional branches of SWPs are more 
likely to enjoy autonomy in decision-making but lack representation at the 
central level. Overall, the electoral framework is very closely connected to 
the internal organizational structures of SWPs, and it can be assumed that 
SWPs would decentralize power to their regional branches following 
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devolution.
In the Spanish case, Fabre (2008: 316) claims that the 
nationalization of electoral results suggests a certain level of centralization 
of party organizations. This argument is backed by the empirical evidence in 
that PP and PSOE “have an interest in limiting the autonomy of the regional 
branches to maintain their internal cohesion and make sure that the poor 
results or policies of one regional branch do not affect the rest of the party.”
The UK case shows a different picture. Detterbeck and Hepburn 
(2010: 123) found that center-left parties tend to grant more autonomy to 
their regional branches than center-right parties. The Labour party has a 
devolved or federal organizational structure (Swenden and Maddens 2009: 
262-3), whereas the Conservatives is more centralized. More interestingly, 
there exists the asymmetry between the Scottish Conservatives and the 
Welsh Conservatives, as a direct result of different patterns of party 
formation. So is the asymmetry between the Catalan socialists of the PSC 
and other ordinary branches of the PSOE (Fabre 2008). 
Consequently, the internal organizational structures of SWPs in 
devolved plurinational states, such as Spain and the UK, have an impact on 
party strategies. As aforementioned, parties may adopt different 
organizational structures, be it centralized or decentralized, as a result of the 
level of interconnectedness between regional and general elections, as well 
as the presence of nationalist parties. In this respect, this paper also takes 
this into account, analyzing party strategies in a comparison between 
regional and general elections. 
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2. The road to the independence referendum
2.1. Catalonia: the resisted independence referendum
The first Catalan election of 1980 resulted in the victory of CiU, 
then a moderate Catalan center-right nationalist party that has maintained 
the large share of votes since then. Convergència i Unió (CiU) enjoyed its 
supremacy as a governing party until 2003 when another nationalist party 
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) of a left ideology joined a 
tripartite coalition to oust CiU from power. The other two parties in the 
coalition were the Catalan Socialists (PSC) and Iniciativa per Catalunya–
Verds (ICV), who are formally regional branches of state-wide parties 
(SWPs) but with a substantial autonomy from their national branches (Martí 
Tomàs 2016: 70). These parties have been long-time proponents of the 
federalization of Spain and supported more autonomy for the Catalan 
institutions. A party system with two Catalan nationalist parties and two 
SWPs supporting more autonomy led to the demand for a new Statute of 
Autonomy of Catalonia, which was hotly debated but eventually agreed 
between these four parties (ibid). The new Catalan charter was voted in the 
Catalan Parliament in September 2005, receiving the support of around 90% 
of the representatives, whereas the Partido Popular (PP), the Catalan branch 
of the Spanish right-wing party, was the only party against which voted. 
After the Catalan Parliament ratified the new Statute of Autonomy, 
it was later revised and modified by the Spanish Parliament to comply with 
the Constitution fully and finally sanctioned in a referendum by the Catalans 
on 18 June 2006. Immediately after being sanctioned, however, the Spanish-
wide PP challenged the new statute on the grounds that the new self-
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government granted to Catalonia went beyond the limits of the Constitution. 
Four years later, the Spanish High Court of Justice has eventually cut back 
14 articles and modified about 30 more articles of the 2006 Status of 
Autonomy. This event is thought to be the trigger to the Catalan secessionist 
movement (e.g., Guibernau 2014; Martí Tomàs 2016), provoking a massive 
demonstration led by the Catalan government and supported by the main 
nationalist political parties on 10 July 2010 in every thoroughfare of 
Barcelona. 
After the failed talks between the then Catalan President Mas and 
Spanish Prime Minister Rajoy on the request to give greater fiscal autonomy 
to Catalonia (Reuters 2012), Mas called an early election on 25 November 
2012 intending to win an absolute majority of seats. Mas and his party CiU 
failed to secure enough seats to form a majority government, so he decided 
to form a political alliance with ERC, the second-largest party.
Meanwhile, the Spanish central government’s mantra is the 
indivisibility of the Spanish nation and the territorial integrity of Spain, a 
central component of the Constitution. Because national sovereignty 
belongs to the Spanish people, the Spanish government has insisted regional 
governments have no right to decide its political future. Also, a Catalan 
referendum would be an illegal act and a violation of national sovereignty, 
according to Spanish PM Mariano Rajoy. In April 2014, a request by the 
Catalan Parliament to the Spanish Parliament to transfer the powers to hold 
a legal referendum, which echoed the mechanism used in the Scottish 
secessionist movement, was rejected.12 An overwhelming majority of 299 
Spanish MPs voted against it, including the main opposition PSOE, while 
                                           
12 The Spanish government explicitly rejected the Scottish precedent because Spain, unlike 
the UK, has a codified constitution that enshrines the unity of the state (Cetra and Harvey 
2018: 5).
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only 46 voted in favor. The Catalan government proceeded to hold a 
referendum anyhow. In September 2014, the Catalan Parliament passed a 
law on ‘popular consultations’ to hold a non-binding referendum on 
independence on 9 November 2014. The Spanish government challenged 
the law in the Constitutional Court, which ruled the vote illegal five days 
before it was held. The vote on self-determination, which came to be known 
as the participation process, was more an act of protest by secessionists than 
a definitive test on independence as it was boycotted by most unionists 
(Liñeira and Cetrà 2015: 263).
For the Catalan government and its supporters, it was unacceptable 
in a liberal democracy to put limits on self-determination if the agreement 
was met through unequivocally democratic means. On the national day of 
Catalonia, days before the early regional election, an alliance of pro-
independence political parties vigorously campaigned for Catalonia’s 
secession under the motto ‘Junts pel Si’ (Together for Yes), while Madrid 
also sent more than 1,000 additional anti-riot police for the Diada 
celebrations in Catalonia. This election scored the highest participation rates 
(77.44%) in the Catalan history and was claimed as a “de facto referendum” 
(Martí and Cetrà 2016) or a ‘plebiscite on independence,’ which was meant 
to bypass the PP-led government's opposition to hold a binding referendum. 
The nationalist coalition Junts pel Sí won 62 seats, while leftist pro-
independence Candidatura d’ Unitat Popular (CUP) gained ten seats, 
meaning that an alliance of these two parties could give teeth to 
secessionists. The Catalan President Artur Mas had then planned to declare 
Catalan independence—at best via referendum, at worst, unilaterally—
within 18 months, and to draft a new constitution within six months 
(Politico 2015). 
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On 1 October 2017, the Catalan government held a second 
independence referendum, which asked voters the question: “Do you want 
Catalonia to be an independent state in the form of a Republic?” The final 
turnout was 43% (2.3 million), while the yes vote counted for 90.2% and the 
no vote 7.8%. However, the vote was opposed by Madrid on the same 
ground as the 2014 vote, and the Court suspended the referendum law. The 
Spanish government remained its firm stance on this issue inexorably. 
Madrid imposed direct rule on Catalonia and called an early election in 
Catalonia on 21 December 2017 after the Catalan Parliament had 
unilaterally declared independence on 27 October 2017. Some of the 
secessionist leaders are arrested or fled the country; those arrested are 
waiting for a trial which may charge them prison terms of up to 25 years on 
charges of rebellion and misused funds (Reuters 2019).
2.2.  Scotland: the negotiated independence referendum
Since 1977, the SNP had been making a blueprint for independence, 
though the referendum date had been repeatedly delayed. In 1999, after the 
establishment of a Scottish Parliament, the SNP proposed an independence 
referendum within the first four-year term of an SNP government. 
Independence was the tenth item in a list of Scotland’s fourteen priorities in 
the election. In the 2003 elections, the SNP emphasized an ability to govern 
competently as a strategy for building support for independence (Mitchell 
2016: 76). It also proposed to hold a referendum within three years of 
coming to power, which was anticipated to take place four years later. 
The independence discussion accelerated when the SNP won 47 out 
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of 129 seats in the 2007 election, allowing it to form a minority government. 
In the first years of its term as the minority government, the SNP launched a 
National Conversation on Scotland’s constitutional future (Scottish 
Government 2007), followed by the Calman Commission established in 
2009 by the opposition parties to consider further devolution with support of 
the UK government as well as the Labour, Conservatives and Liberal 
Democratic parties. Since the global financial crisis of 2008, however, 
domestic discourses mostly revolved around the economic issues, and so 
these two competing versions of Scotland’s future had been ignored.
Until the SNP’s surprise victory in the 2011 Scottish Parliamentary, 
a referendum on independence was a remote hypothetical (Kidd and Petrie 
2016: 29).13 More interesting is that the Additional Member voting system 
built in the devolved Parliament had been deliberately devised to preclude a 
single-party government; the SNP was to be confined by this electoral 
arrangement, which should force cooperation with one or more of the
Unionist parties (ibid). Since the SNP returned majority, the independence 
referendum was inevitable. 
In January 2012, Prime Minister David Cameron indicated his 
willingness to endorse the legitimacy of a referendum on Scottish 
independence. Opinion polling that time clearly showed a resounding no to 
independence. On 15 October 2012, in St. Andrew’s House in Edinburgh, 
Prime Minister Cameron, Secretary of State for Scotland Michael Moore, 
and First and Deputy First Ministers Alex Salmond and Nicola Sturgeon put 
their names to the Agreement between the United Kingdom Government and 
the Scottish government on a Referendum on Independence for Scotland. 
The product of private negotiations between the two governments, what 
                                           
13 In the 2010 UK general election, the SNP had won only six of Scotland’s fifty-nine seats.
33
become known as the Edinburgh Agreement, ended months of uncertainty 
and legal debate over whether Holyrood had the competence to legislate for 
a referendum on Scottish independence (Tickell 2016: 325). 
Besides, the Agreement specified the franchise for the referendum, 
the number of options and questions, the wording of the question (as they 
agreed on a single-question referendum), and a deadline by which the vote 
had to be held (HM Government and Scottish Government 2012). The 
governments agreed to grant powers to hold a referendum on independence 
to Scotland under Section 30 of the Scotland Act 1998. Published in 2013, 
Scottish Government’s White Paper (Scotland’s Future) described itself as a 
guide to an independent Scotland, while the UK government’s Scotland 
Analysis program heavy with data and economic and financial analysis 
mainly discussed the economic consequences of the secession The SNP was 
the biggest party in the official Yes campaign (also including the Scottish 
Green Party and the Scottish Socialist Party), while the Labour, 
Conservatives, and Liberal Democrats supported the No side (Better 
Together campaign). These unionist parties campaigned against 
independence by stressing the advantages of remaining in the UK and 
suggested further devolution for Scotland and made this proposal public 
ahead of the poll to convince voters to reject independence in favor of 
greater power for a permanent Scottish Parliament within the UK. In the 
run-up to the referendum, most remarkable was the involvement of 
grassroots campaigners in both official campaigns that galvanized a more 
direct engagement with voters than is usual in political campaigning 
(Dekavalla 2016: 796).
The Scottish referendum on independence took place on 18 
September 2014. It is worth noting that the 2014 independence referendum 
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took place in a different political context than previous ones: the SNP had 
been in power for the last eight years, taking over from Labour as the most 
popular party in Scotland, while Conservative party has returned to power in 
Westminster in a coalition which promoted economic austerity; 
disengagement with West-minster politics intensified in Scotland due to the 
economic and welfare policies adopted in Westminster and by the 
management of global financial crisis, Iraqi war, and the expenses scandal 
under previous Labour government—there was, therefore, a growing 
disillusionment in Scotland with the major Westminster parties (Dardanelli 
2005).
Scottish people decided to remain part of the UK; the No side won 
with 55.4% votes against independence, while the yes side lost with 44.7% 
votes in favor, which recorded the highest turnout (84.6%) for an election or 
referendum in the UK since the introduction of universal suffrage. 
Following the referendum, a process is underway to transfer further powers 
to the Scottish Parliament in areas such as taxation, welfare, and elections 
(HM Government 2016), as it was a signed in a pledge by three major 
parties in the UK before the referendum. 14 More interestingly, the 
immediate consequence of the independence referendum was the landslide 
victory of the SNP in the 2015 election (for Westminster). The SNP won all 
but three seats in the Scottish Parliament and became the first party in sixty 
years to win 50% of the Scottish vote, gaining 56 seats. The Labour party 
suffered from its severe electoral defeat, losing 40 seats, while the Liberal 
Democrats lost ten seats. “The tectonic plates of Scottish politics shifted” as 
                                           
14 David Cameron, Ed Miliband, and Nick Clegg signed the letter that promised the 
transfer of extensive new powers to the Scottish Parliament, delivered by the process and to 
the timetable agreed by these three parties. Also, it promised the permanence of the Scottish 
Parliament (The Guardian 2014).
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Sturgeon said after the election (BBC 2015).
The recapitulation of these two cases shows essential roles of 
political parties in accelerating and intensifying the nationalist debate 
revolving around the territorial question of the regions, and it resembles 
what territorial political scholars have insisted. Moreover, the substantial 
shift in, or acceleration of, the territorial debate coincided with increasing 
public support for independence, while the two central governments reacted 
to the demands of the nationalist parties differently. The Spanish 
government firmly insisted that the Constitution strictly prohibits the 
holding of a referendum on independence in Catalonia, and inexorably 
reacted to the holding of non-binding referendums. In contrast with the 
Spanish government’s fierce reaction on the Catalan issue, the UK 
government agreed to grant the powers for the holding of the referendum on 
independence to the Scottish government, which produced the ‘legal, fair,
and decisive’ referendum on Scottish independence. Seemingly, this is an 
interesting point of departure that I hope to delve into with academic 
curiosity.  
As I have mentioned earlier in Section 2, I seek to answer the 
question: “why were there variations in state responses to the demands for 
an independence referendum in Catalonia and Scotland?” In the next chapter, 
I, therefore, test an institutional explanation on the difference in these two 
cases. An institutional explanation emphasizes the legal basis of 
independence referendums per se and the constitutional frame of right to 
self-determination. After testing this institutionalist account, I will suggest 
an alternative account from the actor-oriented perspective in that I 
emphasize that in neither case is there a constitutional right to self-
determination and that Scottish party elites managed to gain the legal basis 
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of the Scottish independence referendum from the counterpart elites in the 
central government. Also, I further argue that party dynamics and 
subsequent strategic calculations were behind the different decisions made 
by the two central governments. 
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V. Constitutional right to decide?
1. Catalonia: the legal challenges
As emphasized earlier, in neither case is there a constitutional right 
to self-determination. Both regional governments had tried to earn support, 
at least a permission, to hold a referendum on independence from the central 
governments. The difference between these two cases was that the Spanish 
government resisted the Catalan independence referendum and it quickly 
provoked a confrontation between the two entities, whereas the UK 
government agreed to the holding of the independence referendum and to 
establish its legal basis upon the Edinburgh Agreement. In this section, I 
argue that an institutional explanation, which focuses on the presence of the 
legal basis, on such variations in state responses is not sufficient.
Fundamentally, the Spanish Parliament can delegate or transfer 
powers to regional governments employing organic law under article 150.2. 
This article allows the government to pass a law delegating the power to 
hold a referendum in the Autonomous Communities. The Court (Judgement 
103/2008, 31/2010, 31/2015) has ruled that regional governments have no 
powers to legislate on the referendum because Spanish central institutions 
not only have the power to authorize them but also to legislate them, based 
on the conjunction of articles 23, 81, 92.3 and 149.1.31 of the Constitution 
(ibid.). It implicitly implied that the Spanish Parliament could delegate 
powers to regional governments for the holding of a referendum. Therefore, 
the organic statute under article 150.2 should provide for a delegation or 
transfer of the inherent powers to legislate and the explicit powers to 
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authorize.
This option was the key to Scotland’s lawful referendum on 
independence, whose legality was ratified in the Edinburgh Agreement of 
2012. It was tried in Catalonia as well, as briefly mentioned above. The 
Catalan pro-independence parties, CiU, ERC, CUP, and the leftist green ICV 
presented a resolution in Congress seeking Senate’s approval for the 
referendum under article 150.2 as a legal argument (El Pais 2013). The 
resolution states a referendum in an AC is not “a case in which the nature of 
the subject makes article 150.2 of the Constitution inapplicable” and the 
formula of delegation ad casum is selected “to establish a necessary 
framework of coordination and collaboration between the Spanish State and 
the Generalitat of Catalonia for a commitment to take action on the result of 
the referendum (Parlament de Catalunya 2014).”
The proposal was rejected by an overwhelming majority in the
Spanish Parliament. In response, the Catalan government and the Parliament 
decided to use a non-referendum popular consultation under the Catalan 
Statute 10/2014. This statute establishes any consultation which was used to 
elude the authorization or intervention by the Spanish government under 
article 149.1.32 (Bossacoma and López Bofill 2016: 117). This approach 
had a problem; because the Spanish Constitution implicitly establishes the 
referendum is a kind of popular consultation (ibid), the Catalan 
government’s attempt to elude legal challenges by branding this poll a ‘non-
referendum popular consultation and citizen participation’ has failed.
The Spanish government forcefully reacted to it. Madrid has 
indicated that the Spanish Constitution does not permit such a popular 
consultation that would possibly allow the separation of Catalonia from the 
rest of the state. It added that if the Catalan government takes actions to call 
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for the independence referendum, they would be paralyzed through 
administrative and judicial means (Vintro 2012). In response, the Catalan 
government blamed the Spanish government for violating the fundamental 
right to political participation (Bossacoma and López Bofill 2016: 122-4), 
but, to recall, at the same time it was calling the 2014 polling as non-
referendum popular consultation. In result, in the eye of the Constitutional 
Court, this form of a popular consultation was “a masked referendum (ibid:
134),” which is prohibited by the Constitution.
For the Spanish government, the legal basis for its position is 
founded upon the Constitution of 1978 in line with the provisions of Article 
1 and 2 of the Constitution. Although the preamble recognizes the existence 
of various “peoples in Spain,” the duty to protect their “culture and 
traditions, languages, and institutions” is entrusted to the Spanish people 
(Turp 2017). Further, The Constitution affirms “the Spanish people” as the 
subject of “sovereignty” from whom “all powers of state organs” allegedly 
emanate (art. 1.2) and “the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, the 
common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards (art. 2).” The 
government in Madrid also finds support for their position in the Judgement 
of the Constitutional Court (JC) 103/2008, the leading case on referendums 
and secession in the Basque Country. The Court ruled that holding a 
referendum related to sovereignty would require an amendment to the 
Constitution at the beginning of the process. The Court’s position on the 
territorial integrity, secession and referendum were many times reaffirmed 
in the Judgements 48/2003, 31/2010 and 42/2014.
The Spanish Constitution is “a written, rigid and judicially 
controlled Constitution (Bossacoma and López Bofill 2016: 111).” As 
presumed, the Constitution can be reformed following the amending powers, 
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procedures, and circumstantial limits established in articles 166, 167, 168, 
and 169 (ibid.: 112). Particularly for the issue of independence, the Court 
saw constitutional reform must be made following the procedures outlined 
in the article 168 (Constitutional Court Judgement 19/2017), which is 
known to be the hardest amending process. One possible explanation for 
such a ruling could be a political calculation, in which such a rigid and time-
consuming amending process would prevent secessionist from trying to 
arrange a referendum by constitutional reform or even make them worn out 
amid the proceedings. 
Overall, Catalonia has the legitimate way of holding an 
independence referendum through the organic statute under 150.2, which is 
a similar process that of Section 30 Order that provided in the Edinburgh 
Agreement.15 After reviewing this, it became clear that it was the political 
will of the party elites in the Spanish Parliament that determined the fortune 
of the Catalan independence referendum. What about Scotland? What made 
it possible for Scotland to ‘obtain’ its legal basis for independence 
referendum? After reviewing the legal debate revolved around the 
referendum, it became evident that the political will of the ruling parties and 
party elites was the determinant.  
2. Scotland: the Edinburgh Agreement of 2012
The UK constitution relies on precedent and convention, and 
referendums tend to be utilized in an ad hoc manner when it is perceived to 
                                           
15
Nonetheless, there is interpretative controversy about the scope of constraints to the 
powers and matters that can be delegated or transferred based on the wording of this article
(see Bossacoma and Bofill 2016: 114-5).
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be in the interests of the government (House of Lords 2010). Moreover, 
there is no formal constitutional requirement to hold a referendum in the UK, 
powerfully indicating that the political will of the ‘government’ is a decisive 
factor. In result, the increased use of referendums has been marked by a 
‘lack of consistency’ in UK politics (Mitchell 2016: 76)
When the SNP returned a majority in the Scottish Parliament in 
2011, the Scottish independence had become something more than merely 
hypothetical. In response to the consultation on independence, the UK 
government published Scotland’s constitutional future in 2012, several
months before the Edinburgh Agreement.16 It indicated that "the Scotland 
Parliament does not have the legal authority to hold an independence 
referendum and our firm intention to put that issue beyond doubt" (HM 
Government 2012). Since the Constitution is a reserved matter, meaning that 
the UK Parliament has retained all constitutional sovereignty, the UK 
government temporarily transferred the powers to hold a referendum to the 
Scottish Parliament (HM Government 1998). 
The UK and Scottish governments made an order under Section 30 
of the Scotland Act 1998, which enabled the Scottish government to 
legislate for the referendum legislation nine months before the poll. Under 
the Edinburgh Agreement, the UK and Scottish governments were 
committed to working together in the light of the outcome in the best 
interests of the people of Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom (HM 
Government 2012). Most important is that the minority SNP Government in 
office from 2007 to 11 had tried and failed to achieve the same concession 
                                           
16 The consultation was launched in January 2012 to gather individual’s and organization’' 
opinion on how a legal, fair, and decisive referendum on Scotland's constitutional future 
can be achieved. It was about the “mechanics of ensuring a fair referendum rather the 
implications of the result (HM Government 2012).” Nearly 3,000 individuals and 
organizations responded to this consultation.  
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from the UK Government before the Edinburgh Agreement.
To sum up, I argue that the resisted independence referendum in 
Catalonia was not due to the absence of a legal basis founded upon the 
Constitution. Instead, it was the lack of political will of the political actors 
who determine it, rather than merely the legal impossibility. Also, I argue 
that the negotiated referendum on Scottish independence was a political 
outcome, which interests of the UK government had determined.
In this light, I proceed to analyze the behavior of ruling parties and 
party strategies that led parties to behave in specific ways from actor-
oriented perspectives. To recall, I hypothesized that ruling party elites do 
behave strategically on the issue of an independence referendum for their 
own strategic and rational goals. In other words, ruling parties and party 
elites will utilize the independence issue to retain further and expand their 
share of the vote in upcoming elections.
43
VI. Catalonia: Party dynamics and the behavior of ruling 
party, Partido Popular
1. Incentives created by the party system
Party system of Catalonia includes the traditional left-right 
ideology axis and a territorial axis, where parties position themselves on the 
relationship between Catalonia and the rest of Spain. During the 1990-2010 
period, the party system of Catalonia remained remarkably stable. It 
consisted of five main political parties—two nationalist parties, two state-
wide parties, and one green party. Two nationalist parties, as repeatedly 
mentioned, were a center-right wing party CiU and a left-wing party ERC. 
CiU was a federation of the center-right Convergència Democràtia de 
Catalunya (CDC) and the Christian-Democrat Unió Democràtia de 
Catalunya (UDC), which favored a gradual system of increasing self-
government. CiU has the most potent force in the Catalan elections, which 
had governed Catalonia for 23 years until the tripartite coalition government 
removed it in 2003. ERC is a leftist party, which had moderate claims on 
decentralization and full independence in the long run. Two state-wide 
parties are Partido Popular Català (PPC) and Partit dels Socialistes de 
Catalunya (PSC). PSC is a center-left and federalist party, federated with the 
state-wide party Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE), with which it 
shares a group of a parliamentary group in the Spanish Parliament. This 
party has traditionally been the second dominant party in the Catalan 
elections. In 2003, it formed a coalition party with ERC and ICV, removing 
CiU from the Catalan government after 23 years. PPC is the regional branch 
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of the Spanish Partido Popular (PP), a right-wing and centralist party. This 
party has never been in power in Catalonia although it provided support to 
the CiU government during the 1999-2003 legislature.17 Finally, Iniciativa 
per Catalunya Verds-Esquerra Unida I Alternativa (ICV-EUiA) is a leftist, 
green and federalist coalition party. ICV is a federation of communist and 
socialist parties, who have been traditional proponents of federalism in 
Spain and supported greater decentralization for the Catalan institutions, 
while EUiA is a coalition of leftist and communist parties split from the 
Spanish Izquierda Unida (IU) in 1997. 
Seemingly, until 2010, the political spectrum in Catalonia had 
leaned towards the left, as well as the more decentralization dimension. It is 
worth noting that there are two dimensions in the party system in Catalonia, 
and it implies a crucial aspect. Elections revolve around two dimensions, 
meaning that parties need to determine which dimension would be its 
primary dimension of electoral competition (Alonso 2012: 13-40). 
Traditionally, the territorial dimension often structures the party system in 
Catalonia, whereas the ideological dimensions have more salience in the 
Spanish party system (Guinjoan and Rodon 2016: 22).  
Since 2010, Catalan society’s political preferences have changed.
Polls showed broader support for independence and for pro-independence 
parties (to be discussed in Section 3, Chapter 6). More interestingly, since 
2012 voter preference on the territorial dimension moved from the middle 
position to the extremes, having spread along both sides of the dimension—
                                           
17 CiU provided parliamentary support for the PP's state-level minority government 
between 1996-2000, which put more salience on socioeconomic policies. After the 1999 
Catalan elections when CiU failed to gain enough seats to form a majority government, the 
then leader Jordi Pujol decided to secure legislative support from the PP rather than a 
coalition with ERC, on the grounds of intolerable ideological differences. This 
parliamentary alliance between the PP and CiU in the Spanish and Catalan Parliaments 
during this period was very unpopular (Elias 2015; Elias and Mees 2017: 147).
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either union or a separate state (Aragonès and Ponsatí 2016: 76). At the 
same time, when the electorate was modifying their preferences on the 
territorial dimension, two new parties entered the electoral arena. The first 
party is Ciudadanos (C’s) which is a Catalan and ideologically ambiguous 
but a strongly centralist party, favoring the status quo on the territorial 
dimension. The second is Candidatures d’Unitat Popular (CUP), which is 
also a Catalan party born at the municipal level with strong preferences in 
favor of both full independence and leftist ideology.  
Simultaneously, parties have adopted new and different strategies 
mainly on the territorial dimension amid changing voter preferences and 
political landscape in Catalonia’s party system. I argue that parties have 
changed their position on the territorial dimension opportunistically, which 
will bring them more votes, which resembles what territorial politics 
scholars have noted. On the one hand, ERC and PP moved in a very 
predictable way. ERC has shifted its position from moderate claims of 
decentralization with a long-term wish of full independence to specific 
demands for full independence. PP has moved its position slightly from 
moderate to more extreme claims of centralization, for the union of a whole 
Spain, to defend its constituency from the competition with C’s.
On the other hand, other parties seemed to experience a hard time 
adapting to a new environment. The PSC has suffered severe internal 
turmoil. The party split into several factions, small factions breaking away 
to create new small parties with pro-independence positions and a larger 
faction remaining centralist. The long-time coalition of two different parties, 
CiU, split into halves due to its internal tensions. CDC continues to claim 
statehood for Catalonia and demand independence, while UDC maintains 
the moderate decentralization position. 
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In result, there has been a stiff competition on the territorial 
dimension, with more saliency than does have the ideological dimension. 
On the territorial dimension, C’s and PP are competing for the centralist 
votes, and the CiU, ERC, CUP and PSC’s pro-independence factions are 
competing for independentist votes, while PSC and ICV-EUiA position 
themselves at the center of the dimension. On the ideological dimension, 
ERC, PSC, ICV-EUiA, and CUP are competing for leftist votes, whereas 
CiU, PP and C’s are competing for rights votes. More tellingly, the salience 
of the territorial dimension has become more solidified since 2010. 
Traditionally, Parties have not formed a coalition nor supported parties that 
shared the same political views on the territorial dimension, but based on the 
parties’ ideological identities—either right (CiU and PP) or left (PSC, ERC, 
and ICV-EUiA). Two most significant forces in the Catalan Parliament, CiU 
and ERC, have formed a political alliance to push independence through an 
independence referendum, despite their ideological differences.
By reviewing the party system in Catalonia, it becomes evident that 
the salience of the territorial dimension has been more amplified in the 
electoral arena. Recently, the party system in Catalonia has highly polarized 
along the territorial dimension. More interesting is that a correlation 
between the position of the parties on the two dimensions is found, which 
contradicts the theoretical assumption of Downs’ spatial theory. A left-wing 
party is more likely to be close to its nationalist competitor along the 
territorial dimension than a right-wing party, or vice versa. It implies that 
competition between SWPs and NRPs have intensified. This connection is 
only found in the Catalan case; therefore, I shall make no assumptions 
regarding the connection of the party’s issues positioning on the two 
dimensions.
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Figure 1. Political parties and the two dimensions in the Catalan party 
system since 2010
Note: Circles are an approximation of parties’ position since the 2010 Catalan election. 
The size of the circles indicates the party’s electoral support during the 2010-2012 
period.
NRPs now form a coalition or strategic alliance to push forward 
independence at the expense of the ideological differences, which had never 
happened until 2010 in the Catalan electoral history, and it indicates that 
SWPs’ strategic positioning on the territorial issue is inevitable. Moreover, 
in addition to the substantial growth of CiU and ERC, the entry of new 
parties into the electoral arena is corresponded by the strategic decisions of 
SWPs, including the PSC and PP, how to react to the highly-polarized party 
system. In the next section, I seek to explain how electoral competitions 
between NRPs and SWPs, and SWPs have effects on the SWP’s strategies. 
For the purposes of discussion, I pay special attention to the competition 
between SWPs—PSC, C’s, and PPC.
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2. Incentives created by the party competition
Scholars suggest that in Spain the nationalization of the party 
system is robust and SWPs are expected to remain quite integrated, meaning 
that regional divergence over party policy to win electoral popularity at the 
regional level is not much tolerated (Caramani 2005: 315). Indeed, the
Catalan branches of SWP’s are mirror images of their central branches and, 
for that reason, party competitions in both regional and general elections 
must be taken into account to understand these parties’ strategies vis-à-vis 
territorial demands of nationalist parties. Further, I argue that PP’s strategy 
against the independence issue since 2012 has revolved around the 
‘ownership battle’ with C’s at both the regional and national level. After I 
explain the reasoning behind this argument, I introduce another evidence, 
before the independence debate, which empirically confirms my argument 
on the effects of party competition on the SWP’s strategy vis-à-vis territorial 
demands.
As discussed earlier, when two major nationalist parties moved 
from a moderate to an extreme stance on the territorial question, PPC used 
an adversarial strategy. Again, the strategic positioning of PPC mirrors that 
of the state-wide party in adopting a strong position in favor of the unity of 
the state and in making of it a salient issue of the party discourse. After the 
then Catalan President Mas called a snap election in 2012, the political 
landscape in Catalonia showed a different picture compared to ten years ago. 
Pro-independence nationalist parties (CiU, ERC, ICV-EUiA, and CUP) have 
overtaken the electoral arena, securing 87 seats combined, whereas PSC lost 
a large share of seats and dropped to a historic low of twenty. PSC 
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converged toward the demand of nationalist parties along the territorial 
dimension this time for the independence referendum, not independence. In 
the run-up to the 2012 election, PSC did not clarify its position on 
independence, letting voters question whether it supports independence or 
something else. It made it clear that for the referendum to be held, it must be 
agreed with the Spanish government. Amid the highly polarized political 
space, this ambiguous positioning on the territorial issue turned out to have 
adversely affected the electoral fortune of PSC.
In the meantime, PP was close to being the runner-up. It 
successfully secured the seat share of nineteen, suggesting that it has 
consolidated its position in the Catalan Parliament despite being in the 
government at the national level, where it also applied harsh austerities. 
There was also a bad story for the electoral fortune of PP; C’s has grown a 
successful competitor to PP, securing nine seats in the Catalan election. 
There are two crucial aspects to the PP’s competition with C’s. First, the 
public perception of the C’s position on the ideological dimension located 
towards the center from the right pole, meaning that C’s has taken an 
advantageous position on the ideological dimension, compared to PP, which 
is anchored in the Downsian paradigm. Second, PP had almost exclusively 
‘owned’ the centralist position on the territorial dimension until 2012, but 
this quickly growing competitor, C’s, started encroaching upon the same 
issue position, as mentioned earlier.
Amid the heated debate on Catalonia’s independence, PP and C’s 
both sharply opposed to the nationalist parties’ proposal on the holding of 
the independence referendum in 2014. The reason why PP has still held on 
to the adversarial strategy against the nationalist parties is quite simple. As 
the PPC competes with C’s for the centralist position, rather than with 
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Catalan nationalist parties, the PP does not risk incurring in severe electoral 
losses by adopting a rigid stance on demand for a Catalan independence 
referendum. Furthermore, the incumbent PPC at the central government 
would not risk making a conversion of issue positioning at election time. It 
would instead try to replicate the same strategy that put the party in office in 
the previous election since this strategy of issue positioning had been proven 
a winning combination (Meguid 2008: 44). Therefore, it can be explained 
that PPC and PP have maintained its territorial position and saliency it had 
in the 2011 election to focus on the campaign on its incumbency and on the 
issue, it has owned.
Figure 2. Ideological distribution of parties in the public perception 
in Spain, 2015
Source: Orriols and Cordero (2016)
I introduce another case that confirms my argument in pertinence 
with the relationship between party competition and SWP’s strategy vis-à-
vis territorial demands. When the 2003 left-wing coalition government 
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drafted the new charter for Catalonia’s autonomy before the independence 
debate has surfaced, in that I contend that PPC-PP’s strategy against NRP’s 
territorial demands revolved around the competition between PSC-PSOE at 
the national level.
From 1980-1999, CiU’s territorial aims were to accrue political 
capacities and resources through permanent bargaining (Aragonès and 
Ponsatí 2016: 63) to complete its constitutional development with the final 
transfers of powers to Catalonia. In other words, it was the period of 
numerous bargaining between the two governments, quite a different picture 
from the 2010s. The 2003 regional election heightened the territorial 
disputes and shook the political landscape of Catalonia. Following the 
election, the left-wing party coalition of PSC, ERC, and ICV worked on a 
new statute of autonomy to tackle Catalan resentment over its net 
contribution to the state budget. In response, on April 15, 2004, the then 
Spanish Prime Minister Zapatero from PSOE promised: “a more 
sympathetic approach to Catalan demands for greater devolution including a 
new Statute of Autonomy and a better financial arrangement (Guibernau 
2004: 218).”
I argue this left-wing party coalition has an electoral strategic
rationale behind. PSC’s centralizing tendencies in power, the slow progress 
on promised economic and social reforms, and the dependency on the party 
elites in Madrid questioned the ability of PSC and PSOE to stand up for 
Catalan interests (Equipo de Sociologica Electoral 1980). However, from 
2004 onwards PSOE’s approach to the Catalan political space has evolved 
by increasing the Catalanist profile of PSC. Seemingly, PSC had been the 
second-largest party in the Catalan Parliament after CiU during this period, 
and CiU’s nationalist issue profile directly threatened it, so PSC had to react 
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to it strategically. In this light, PSC would have determined to move toward 
CiU to take moderately nationalist votes or to prevent nationalist voters 
defecting to this nationalist competitor. 
In the meantime, at the national level, PSOE would have also 
strategically chosen to accommodate Catalonia’s bid for constitutional 
reform. It is partly because other ACs had been completing their 
constitutional development for further decentralization, meaning that 
rejecting multiple proposals of greater decentralization would backfire and 
highly likely to hurt PSOE in the next 2008 election; it is also partly because 
this accommodative strategy would distinguish them from the PP, who then 
displayed a sharp Spanish nationalist rhetoric against peripheral nationalists’
demands, which heightened territorial disputes (Balfour and Quiroga 2007).
Table 1. Number of seats in the Catalan Parliament by parties
1980 1984 1988 1992 1995 1999 2003 2006 2010 2012 2015 2017
JxSí 62 66
CiU 43 72 69 70 60 56 56 48 62 50
PSC 33 41 42 40 34 50 42 37 28 20 16 17
ERC 14 5 6 11 13 12 23 21 10 21
PPC 11 6 7 17 12 15 23 21 10 21 4
ICV-EUIA 25 6 9 7 11 5 9 12 10 13 11
C’S 3 3 9 25 36
CUP 3 10 4
Others 20 3 4 8
Source: ICPS.cat 
Simultaneously, PP not only rejected the new statute in the 
Parliament and asked for a rejection to it in the referendum, but also 
challenged the new statute, which was already ratified through the 
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referendum, to the Constitutional Court because it was unconstitutional. It 
can be explained that because, for PP, it was clear that a rejection of the 
Catalan statute would have been much damaging to the PSOE government. 
Because the PSOE was receiving the parliamentary support of the Catalan 
ERC in Madrid and at the same time the Catalan Socialists were in control 
of the Catalan Parliament thanks to a regional coalition of PSC, ERC, and 
ICV. Had the Catalan statute not prospered, the Socialist-led government in 
either Madrid or Catalonia could have collapsed (Muro 2009: 464).
As a result of this territorial dispute, the effectiveness of different 
strategies adopted by PSC-PSOE and PPC-PP showed different pictures. 
PSC-PSOE’s accommodative strategy in reaction to its nationalist 
competitor, CiU, turned out prolific only at the national level. In the 2008 
general election, they secured 169 seats which were a narrow victory, but 
large enough to form a majority government. However, in the 2006 regional 
election PSC lost its five seats, yet still secured its position as the second-
largest force in the Catalan Parliament. More interesting is that CiU also lost 
its eight seats, while PP gained seven seats, the best result it would ever 
have for the next thirteen years (at the time of writing).
In addition to incentives created by the polarized party system and 
intensified competition between nationalist parties and PPC, and PSC, C’s 
and PPC, incentives created by the public opinion account for the ruling 
party’s strategic calculation regarding the demands of nationalist parties for 
holding an independence referendum. In the next section, I will discuss how 
the opinion polling played a part in the party’s devising its strategy.
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3. Incentives created by public opinion 
Political parties maximize their votes to gain office and implement 
their preferred policy choices (Strøm 1990). Consequently, parties that aim 
at taking and staying in the office would be more responsive to the 
electorate interests and demands to increase their share of the vote. At the 
same time, “parties, unlike issues or candidates, give continuity and 
structure to the political debate, and act as ‘perpetual screens’ through which 
individuals follow the political process (Liñeira and Cetrà 2015: 259).” It 
means that party position on the territorial issue reflect but may also affect 
followers’ constitutional preferences. Thus, this last section explores public 
support for constitutional change, and from so doing, I hope to explain party 
strategies more comprehensively.
As aforementioned, demands for an independent Catalan state have 
gained momentum after the Constitutional Court’s ruling in 2010 to curtail 
the new Statute of Autonomy that had been approved and ratified four years 
earlier (e.g., Guibernau 2014; Rico and Liñeira 2014). However, as seen in 
Figure 3, popular support for independence has risen in fast pace from 2012 
when mass demonstration seeking for a Catalan state took place, while 
support either for status quo or federalization has gradually decreased. 
However, this trend started to change from 2014, with popular support for 
independence decreasing by 6.1 percent point and for federalization 
increasing by 4 percent point. It can be understood partly as a response to 
the Madrid government’s firm stance on the Catalan issue. Nevertheless, on 
9 November 2014, the Catalan government pushed forward with non-
referendum popular consultation on Catalonia’s constitutional future in 
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defiance of the Constitutional Court.
Figure 3. Preferences in territorial arrangement in Catalonia, 2010-2015
Source: Political Opinion Barometer Press report (CEO; 2015)
Long term evidence suggests that Catalans feeling more Catalan 
than Spanish and exclusively Catalan have grown from 24% by 1979 to 
more than 40% by 2010. In contrast, population feeling attached to the 
Spanish identity and more to the Spanish identity than the Catalan identity 
has fallen than 15% point according to the CEO survey. Furthermore, those 
who identify themselves more Catalan than Spanish and exclusively Catalan 
are more likely to support independence, compared with those feeling more 
Spanish than Catalan and exclusively Spanish, as shown in Figure 4. From 
this, it could be argued that national identities remain as the central to 
secessionism, yet it does not presuppose a predetermined transformation 
into secessionist attitudes (Hale 2008: 39).
For instance, 40-45% of the population express predominant 
regional identities in Catalonia, while in Scotland (around 60%) or the 
Basque Country (above 50%) the figure is significantly higher (Serrano 
2013: 528-9). However, support for independence in these three cases is 
similar or even higher in Catalonia (ibid.). In this respect, it should not be 
assumed that regional identity is a simple function to rising secessionism. 
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Instead, rising support for independence must be understood in the political 
context, in which political parties have maneuvered and intensified the 
nationalism debate. It coincided with the economic downturn, rising 
unemployment, spending cuts and structural reforms as remedies for 
increasing government deficits led to public dissatisfaction with the central 
government as well as a sharp surge of social unrest that filled the streets in 
the early 2010s. In result, the election to the Catalan parliament held in 
November 2012 produced a parliament heavily polarized on the territorial 
issue, with traditionally minor parties gaining ground for over mainstream 
formations (Rico and Liñeira 2014: 257). 
Figure 4. Support for independence by Moreno national identity, 2011
Notes: Respondents were asked: “If tomorrow a referendum was held to decide the 
independence of Catalonia, what would you do?” 
Source: Barometer CEO-652, Serrano (2013)
This trend has continued until recently. In the 2015 and 2017 
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elections, secessionists maintained their majority in the parliament. 18 A 
recent change in the Catalan political landscape is that the main anti-
independence party, C’s, has emerged as the largest in the parliament (35 
seats), while pro-independence parties won a slim majority, gaining 70 out 
of 125 seats. From closely looking at the relationship between voting 
behavior and support for independence, it was found that most of those who 
have vote intention to the pro-independence political parties, such as CiU 
(78.8%), ERC (91.9%), and CUP (89.7%), unsurprisingly support 
independence. Similarly, an overwhelming majority of those have vote 
intention to the centralist parties or parties that are ambiguous on the 
territorial dimension, such as PP (88.1%), PSC (86.2%), C’s, (94.8%) and 
Podemos (79.2%), do not support independence. Support for independence 
and vote intention to the pro-independence parties coincide as presumed, 
meaning that Catalonia’s party politics weighs heavily on the territorial 
dimension. Also, more tellingly, secessionists’ strategy to reap electoral 
benefits from the nationalist symbolism of on-going struggle with Madrid 
turned out prolific. So, did the anti-independence parties in a similar way. 
The popular perception of the Spanish government can explain why 
two independence referendums, or popular consultations, in Catalonia 
recorded such low turnout rates, compared with Scotland. According to the 
CEO press report published in 2015 (see Figure 5), more than half Catalans 
identified that the Spanish government is not likely to finally offer an 
agreement, which would possibly end the conflict between Catalonia and 
Madrid (64.5% of respondents). In the meantime, only the minority viewed 
                                           
18 After the unilateral declaration of independence by secessionist parties in the Catalan 
Parliament following the independence referendum held on October 1, 2017, the Spanish 
Senate voted to invoke Article 155 of the Spanish Constitution. It allowed Prime Minister 
Rajoy to dismiss the Catalan government and to dissolve the Catalan Parliament, calling for 
an early election.
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that the Spanish government is likely to offer an agreement (21.5%). In this 
respect, the two referendums’ turnouts relate to the impact of inefficacy; 
because people believe that their votes are not meaningful, they instead 
decided not to participate in regards to opportunity costs. It can be 
understood that the Spanish legal framework mainly, more precisely the 
Spanish government’s use of it, is key to framing citizen’s support for the 
option for independence, as seen in public opinion on the constitutional 
future of Spain, which has been strikingly polarized for over many years.
Figure 5. The popular perception of the Spanish government’s willingness 
for accommodation
Note: Respondents were asked: “To what extent do you think it is likely that the 
Spanish government will finally offer an agreement that would be acceptable for a 
majority of the Catalan Parliament?”
Source: Barometer CEO-804 
In sum, the climate of polarization on the constitutional question 
that permeated public opinion in Catalonia has been successfully articulated 
by the pro-independence parties to change voter preferences. The reasoning 
behind this argument is, as shown in this section, that support for 
independence skyrocketed from 2012, whereas the Catalan party system has 
remarkably polarized since 2010. To recapitulate. The parties had moderate 
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territorial claims until 2010, even the nationalist parties like CiU and ERC.
In response to the rising public discontent with the central government and 
public anger around by the legal challenging of the new Statute of 2006, 
nationalist parties moved from moderate claims to explicitly demanding 
independence. In the leadership under the grassroots organizations with 
support by the pro-independence parties, mass demonstration for a Catalan 
state inundated the streets of Barcelona twice in 2010 and 2012, followed by 
a rise in support for independence since 2012.  
In the meantime, the centralist parties’ delicate articulation of the 
public opinion also worked. When support for independence skyrocketed in 
2012, the centralist parties secured the ‘no’ votes at least a base level of 40% 
and more than 45%, with the abstention added (see Figure 3). Given that 
support base, particularly the PP-led Spanish government forcefully and 
firmly resisted the demands for the independence referendum in Catalonia. 
Also, it was proven that PP successfully manipulated the public opinion as 
the independence referendums turnouts counted for around 40% both times. 
Overall, this confirms the statement that “the voting behavior of individuals 
is an effect of the activities of political parties (Przeworski and Sprague 
1986: 9).”
This is the point where the Catalan case diverges from the Scottish 
case; whereas public opinion was articulated by both pro-independence and 
anti-independence parties in Catalonia, it was predominantly articulated by 
the unionist parties in Scotland, albeit there was no clear sign of pre-existing 
public dissatisfaction with the constitutional status of Scotland. It is further 
to be discussed in the next chapter.
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VII. Scotland: Party dynamics and the behavior of ruling 
party, the Conservatives
1. Incentives created by the party system
Just like the Catalan, the Scottish party system is bi-dimensional, 
but it is not as complicated as the former. Since the devolution, the voting 
behavior of the Scottish regional election was very much similar to that of 
the UK general election until 2007. The three main British SWPs are present 
in Scotland, and their regional branches enjoy a significant level of 
autonomy, compared to that of Spanish SWPs in Catalonia (Detterbeck and
Hepburn 2010).
The Scottish Liberal-Democrats have traditionally been a federalist 
party (Fabre and Martínez-Herrera 2009), but position themselves on the 
unionist pole along the territorial dimension and at the same time the center-
left pole along the ideological dimension. The Labour party as an SWP is 
traditionally a left-wing party, but the 1990s the New Labor’s shift to the 
center reduced the gap between the party and the Conservatives and more 
importantly eliminated any left-right ideological difference with the party’s 
main rival, the Scottish National Party (SNP) (Paterson 2006; Paterson et al. 
2001). Moreover, the Scots located the Labour near the nationalist pole on 
the territorial dimension because it is thought to be the pioneer in the 
Scottish devolution, although the party did not traditionally support 
devolution, but strategically first supported devolution in the 1970s when it 
felt it was losing ground to the SNP.
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The Conservatives party, officially the Scottish Conservative and 
Unionist Party, is the only right-wing party and unionist party. Traditionally, 
it was long regarded as a true defender of Scottish interests within the Union 
until the 1950s (Kidd 2008). However, in Thatcher years it suffered an 
electoral decline amid anti-Tory sentiment prevailed in the 1990s, losing 
much of its electoral base in Scotland. More devastating was the party lost 
their last remaining MP norther of the border ahead of the devolution 
referendum in 1997, to which it opposed.
The SNP is the main and the only relevant NRP in Scotland. 
Founded in 1934 as an advocate for Scottish home rule, it clamored for 
Scottish independence since the late 1980s. The SNP is a center-left social 
democratic and pro-independence party. Over three Scottish Parliament 
elections from 2003, the SNP had increasingly gained support among who 
supported independence while also expanding its support beyond that base.
Table 2. Scottish Parliamentary election results in number of seats, 1999-
2011
1999 2003 2007 2011 2016
Labour 56 50 46 37 24
SNP 35 27 47 69 63
Conservatives 18 18 17 15 31
Liberal-Democrats 17 17 16 5 5
Others 3 17 3 3 6
Source: Scottish Parliament.
The 2007 Scottish Parliamentary elections marked the decline of 
Labour, which had led the Scottish government since the devolution. 
Labour’s support in Scotland had been slipping away over many years. 
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Many Scottish voters once identified with their working-class and trade 
union roots, yet Labour had lost its traditional bastions when Scotland’s 
largest trade union opposed the motion, and some SNP candidates were 
given donations from trade unions (Mitchell 2014: 267). The Scots saw Jack 
McConnell, the leader of Labour and the First Minister of Scotland from 
2001 to 2007, as to be under the control of his party’s leadership in London 
(ibid: 266). More critical was that he refused to criticize the Blair 
government on the Iraq War, by which Scots were angered because the Blair 
government did not consult with the Scottish Parliament, without “the 
strongest possible democratic scrutiny (The Telegraph 2002).” At the same 
time, to the eyes of Scots, the Labour party seemed to be no longer different 
from the national branch in London, while it was identified with “their 
mistaken policies and the system of government as the causes of New 
Labour’s failure (Mitchell 2014: 267).” 19 Simultaneously, the Scots’ 
perception of Labour had shifted since 2007. When voters were asked in 
2011 where they placed Scottish political parties on a scale for the 
constitutional status,20 The SNP and Conservatives were perceived to lie at 
opposite ends of the spectrum, and Labour shifted more towards the 
opposition side (id. 2016: 83). 
Resulting in forty-seven SNP MSPs, forty-six Labour MSPs, 
seventeen Conservatives, sixteen Lib-Dems, two Greens and one 
independent, the 2007 Holyrood election marked the new party system in 
Scotland that is characterized by realignment and ideological convergence 
                                           
19 Before devolution, even when Labour was in government in Britain, its distinctiveness 
in Scotland was much appreciated. While Labour government had accepted nuclear 
weapons, failed to stand up to the United States on the Vietnamese War, cut back public 
pending in economic and fiscal crises, the party in Scotland kept its distance from the 
policies decided in London (Mitchell 2014: 267). 
20 The scale indicated opposition to or support for more powers for Holyrood.
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in the party system. As mentioned above, the public perception of Labour 
had shifted to incline more towards the opposition side (status-quo) on the 
territorial dimension, and voters’ defection to SNP and dealignment with 
Labour corresponded it.
Figure 6. Political parties and the two dimensions in the Scottish party 
system since 2007
Notes: Abbreviation for parties are SNP (Scottish National Party), Green (Scottish 
Green), Lab (Scottish Labour), LD (Liberal Democrats), CON (Scottish Conservatives)
In sum, the Scottish party system is not as complicated as the 
Catalan one, with a smaller number of parties and one relevant nationalist 
party. The Scottish political landscape has distinct features. On the one hand, 
all SWPs are unionist, while NRPs (including the Scottish Green and other 
smaller parties) position themselves on the independence side along the 
territorial dimension. It means that the SNP exclusively owns the 
independence issue while the Conservatives, Labour, and Liberal-Democrats 
are competing for the ownership of the union and integrity of the UK issue. 
On the other hand, the Conservatives party is the only right-wing party,
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while other parties are located on the left side of the ideological dimension. 
It implies that there is stiff competition between SWPs on the territorial 
dimension amid the heated independence debate since 2007.
2. Incentives created by the party competition
Some may argue that the 2012 Edinburgh Agreement between the 
UK and Scottish governments on the terms of the 2014 Scottish referendum 
was the product of Cameron’s personal preference for direct democracy or 
the coalition government’s particular preference for ‘flexible unionism’
(McGarvey 2015: 93). The rationale behind the decision of the UK 
government to sign the agreement for the holdings of the referendum should 
be understood in terms of party dynamics and electoral strategies of the 
ruling parties. I argue that the Conservatives’ accommodative strategy 
revolved around the competition with the Labour. Because, as mentioned 
earlier, regional and state-wide elections are disconnected in the UK, I will 
focus on the competition between the Conservatives and the Labour at the 
Holyrood elections.
The decline of the Conservatives party in Scotland through 1980s 
and 1990s left them with no Scottish MPs in 1997. The proportional 
electoral system in the Scottish Parliament allowed for some recovery, but 
the Conservatives remained a toxic brand in Scotland, and the Liberal 
Democrats suffered by their association with it (Cetrà and Harvey 2018: 16; 
McGarvey 2015: 101). In the post-devolution era, most striking was that the 
Conservatives party in Scotland barely won support from the Scots, in 
contrast with the situation in Wales. While Plaid Cymru was in the doldrums, 
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the Welsh Conservatives gained votes and seats in 2011. In contrast, the 
SNP became a sole governing party, and the Conservatives won only 15 
seats.
The SNP’s primary strategy over many years has contained valence 
considerations. It believed that voters’ constitutional preferences were 
influenced by the assessments of their expectations of the SNP’s capacity to 
deliver in public policy terms. If the SNP could prove itself competent, it 
might not only become the ‘natural party of government in Edinburgh,’ but 
that this would spill over into support for independence (Mitchell 2016: 78). 
With its manifesto promising independence, the SNP incrementally 
expanded its electoral base even beyond voters who support independence 
over three elections. In the 2011 elections, the SNP gained support from 
15% of those who support a status-quo and 50% of those who support for 
more powers, winning sixty-nine seats in the Parliament. In the meantime, 
the Conservatives had almost no support among those in favor of 
independence, and most of their supporters were those in favor of status quo.
It suggested that opinion in favor of independence had polarized by party, 
though less so among those who preferred more powers or the status-quo to 
independence. That the SNP not only almost exclusively owned the 
independence issue but also had expanded its electoral base meant that the 
Conservatives had to make a move to take votes away from other SWPs. 
When the Conservatives was directly threatened by the SNP, the 
competition with the Labour posed it a more severe threat.
There are two crucial aspects of the Conservatives’ competition 
with the Labour. First, the public perception of the Labour’s position on the 
territorial dimension shifted towards the Conservatives, in favor of status-
quo, meaning that now the two parties compete for the same issue position. 
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Second, these two parties both have been losing credit with the people of 
Scotland. It meant they were losing ground on valence politics as well to the 
SNP. The Conservatives was even more vulnerable to it, than was the 
Labour. Because the Conservatives had been only a minor opposition party, 
it had less reputation in valence politics in Scotland. Valences issues were 
brought when the SNP and the Labour are ideologically close and have few 
major policy differences between them (Johns et al. 2009).
In this context, the Conservatives got a chance. In reaction to the 
territorial demands of the SNP and small pro-independence parties, it 
accommodated the proposal of the independence referendum in 2012 and 
the rationale behind the Conservatives’ accommodative strategy was just as 
simple. By converging towards the issue position of the SNP, the 
Conservatives could take voters in favor of further devolution and the 
constitutional status-quo from the Labour, and possibly a small number of 
the Labour’s defectors to the SNP.
Further, the Conservatives, Labour, and Liberal-Democrats of the 
unionist camp, in the run-up to the referendum, proposed further devolution 
for Scotland and made this proposal public ahead of the poll to convince 
voters to reject independence in favor of greater power for a permanent 
Scottish Parliament within the UK. Seemingly, this was also a strategic 
move to manage to win supporters of the SNP in favor of further devolution 
over to their side, and the Conservatives’ intention behind this proposal was 
even more evident after it signed to the Edinburgh Agreement in 2012.
The effects of party competition on the ruling party’s reaction to 
the territorial demands are also relevant in the previous Scottish Labour era. 
During the 1999-2007 period, the Labour-Liberal Democrats coalition did 
not have many incentives to adopt an accommodative strategy vis-à-vis 
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territorial demands of SNP for two reasons. First, because the SNP that time 
was not significant enough to threaten the Labour and other SWPs. 
Moreover, second, because the Labour party was also in government in 
London, and there was no need to bring the territorial question on the 
agenda on a nationwide scale (Martí Tomàs 2015: 220).
It is also important to note that the independence debate accelerated 
without any clear evidence of dissatisfaction with the constitutional status 
quo (McHarg 2016: 101). I point that independence was at the heart of the 
amplified political scene to a greater extent that the Scottish political parties 
manipulated and strategically behaved for their own good, more tellingly 
than the Catalan case.
3. Incentives created by public opinion
In this section, I argue that the pre-referendum opinion polling has 
played its part in Cameron’s strategic calculation. The Calman Commission 
found insofar as there was widespread support for constitutional reforms, 
there was support for more devolution, rather than independence (McHarg 
2016: 102). Surveys measuring constitutional preferences among the option 
of independence, devolution, or no Scottish Parliament, found that 
independence support ranged from 24% to 35% between 1999 and 2014 and 
further devolution from 50% to 62% (What Scotland Thinks 2014). For 
these reasons, Cameron’s view that the Union would win a crushing victory 
and that demand for independence would be defeated have also partly 
attributed to his decision in the agreement. 
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Figure 7. Attitudes towards how Scotland should be governed 2007-2016
Note: Data for 2008 is not available. Up to and including 2015 interviewed adults aged 
18 and over. In 2016 those aged 16 or 17 were also interviewed for the first time. If 
thee 16 and 17-year-olds are excluded, the proportion choosing independence falls to 
45% while the remaining figures are unchanged. The first ‘independence’ option refers 
to independence, the second to some variant of ‘devo max’ or ‘home rule’, and the last 
‘No Parliament’ to limiting the responsibilities of the Scottish Parliament to those set 
out in the original Act that established the Scottish Parliament, which represents 
opposition to any kind of devolution.
Source: Data from Table 1 in Curtice, J. (2016) 
The Scottish Social Attitudes (SSA) survey revealed incrementally 
increasing Scottish support for independence since the advent of devolution 
in 1999. The lowest levels of support for independence were recorded in 
2010, three years after the SNP first came to power as a minority 
government, and again in 2012, a year after the SNP became a majority 
government. Even in 2014, when a survey was conducted immediately 
before the referendum, support for independence remained low at no more 
than 33%. Strikingly, when the survey was conducted after the general 
election in which the SNP took more than half seats in the House of 
Commons in 2015, support for independence rose to an all-time high of 
39%. It recorded even higher at 46% in the most recent survey.
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Most people identified themselves in one of the three categories in 
Figure 8. For instance, in 2016 29% said they were equally Scottish and 
British, 28% that they were more Scottish than British, and 24% that they 
were Scottish and not British (Curtice 2016: 8). Those with a strong sense of 
Scottish identity have been more likely to support independence. During the 
referendum campaign in 2012, less than half of those who said they were 
‘Scottish, not British’ indicated their support for independence. Now, this 
figure has gone up to at least two-thirds. Similarly, those who put 
themselves in ‘more Scottish than British’ showed their increasing support 
for independence. In sum, a majority of those who identify themselves 
exclusively or predominantly Scottish are highly likely to support 
independence.
Figure 8. Support for independence by Moreno national identity, 2012-16 
Note: The level of support for independence registered in response to SSA survey 
questions are broken down by a measure of national identity known as the Moreno 
question (Moreno 1988). The respondents were asked to indicate what combination of 
feeling Scottish and feeling British best describes themselves.
Source: Data from Table 3 in Curtice, J. (2016) 
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The picture looks very different for those ‘equally Scottish and 
British.’ In 2014, weeks and months before the independence referendum, 
around one-tenth of those who identified themselves equally Scottish and 
British indicated support for independence. The figure is now one-fourth in 
the most recent survey, meaning that pro-independence movement has been 
galvanizing their support beyond those exclusively and predominantly 
Scottish.
It is important to note that while in each election (Westminster and 
Holyrood elections) those in favor of independence have been more likely to 
vote for the SNP than have those against, support for independence and 
voting for the SNP have been far from synonymous with each other (Curtice 
2016:11). According to the SSA survey (2016), until the 2012 Westminster 
election, only around half of those who supported independence voted for 
the SNP. In 2015, as many as 85% of those who supported independence 
voted for the SNP. Meanwhile, the party has been successful in winning 
support from those in favor of independence since 2007—around 80% of 
this group. Unsurprisingly, it has won support from a minority of the 
unionists, from the lowest of 8% in 2005 (as Westminster election) to the 
highest of 38% in 2011 (at Holyrood election). It is partly because the SNP 
was thought to be providing Scotland with effective government—as it was 
valence issue—rather than because of enthusiasm for its policy of 
independence (Johns et al. 2013). To this extent, interestingly this 
constitutional question, which was held to be a class position issue, now 
seems to have a strong connection with valence politics.
Overall, the independence referendum has virtually increased the 
salience of the constitutional future of Scotland in its electoral politics. Just 
like pro-independence parties in Catalonia, SNP has been successful in 
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reaping electoral benefits from the nationalist question of the critical debates 
most people engaged in for many years. From looking at the opinion 
polling, it becomes evident that the electoral success of SNP has not been 
equal to increasing public support for independence. Instead, SNP 
successfully managed its party image and the public perception of its 
commitment to Scottish interests. Had Cameron and party elites known that 
they would win by 55.4%, possibly they would not risk the future 
relationship between the UK and Scotland on the ballot.
It becomes more evident that the public opinion was one of the 
crucial factors for explaining the Conservatives’ accommodative strategy 
regarding the territorial question. There was no clear sign of pre-existing 
dissatisfaction with the constitutional status of Scotland, albeit with a tinge 
of demands for further devolution, So the unionist parties significantly 
articulated the public opinion, pushing through the agreement for the 
delegation of powers. It becomes more evident that the public opinion is of
importance to the ruling party’s strategic incentives when compared to the 
latest case evidence.
As mentioned earlier, this year Theresa May has refused the proposal 
of the Scottish government to delegate powers to hold the referendum on 
independence for the second time. Her refusal can be explained in the 
context of party competition and public opinion. First, while the weakening 
of the Labour party in Scotland has been in place since 2007 and the 
Conservatives has doubled its seats in the Scottish Parliament in 2016, the
SNP has consolidated its position as ‘the defender of Scottish interests,’
securing all, but three seats in Westminster election in Scotland. It meant 
that the voting behavior of the Scottish people has substantially moved from 
position issues to valence issues. Second, it is risky to allow the 
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independence referendum when the independence option has at least a base 
level of 46% (see Figure 7), compared to 32% several months before the 
Edinburgh Agreement was settled. Simultaneously, the Brexit referendum 
marked a stark distinction between Scotland and the rest of the UK (except 
London and Northern Ireland) on the EU membership issue, which was like 
an open flame in the woods. Third, the Scots have already gained a promise 
on further devolution and relevant legislation (the Scotland Bill 2015 and 
the Scotland Act 2016) are put in place. Promises on further devolution will 
not again attract them.
In result, the Conservatives has focused more exclusively on the 
unionist side as the party’s “primary dimension of competition” (Alonso 
2012), whereas the SNP promised the second referendum in the 2016 
election manifestos. The Conservatives has outflanked the Labour, 
positioning themselves as the leading unionist campaign with the ‘no second 
independence referendum’ argument. Electorally, it was a successful shift as 
in the 2016 election they showed its revival for the first time since 1983.
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VIII. Conclusion
This paper addressed territorial party politics about frustrated 
secessions in plurinational democracies. This analysis sought to explain 
variations in state responses in Catalonia and Scotland to the demands of the 
independence referendums by the nationalist regional parties. With a focus 
on the electoral logic of actions of the ruling parties as a point of departure, 
it explored the party dynamics and the behaviors of parties through a case 
comparison. From doing so, it found that parties made strategic calculations 
vis-à-vis the incentives created by the party system, party competition, and 
public opinion. Also, further, this analysis empirically proved that ruling 
party elites do behave strategically on the issue of an independence 
referendum for their own strategic and rational goals. Put it differently, 
ruling parties and party elites utilize the independence issue to retain further 
and expand their share of the vote in upcoming elections.
Interestingly, it found that the party competition between state-wide 
parties is a highly relevant factor in explaining state variations. Amid the 
changing party system, in which parties have adopted new and different 
strategies, ruling parties chose either an accommodative or adversarial 
strategy in response to the territorial demands of nationalist regional parties, 
intending to have an impact on the electoral fortune of other state-wide 
rivals. In this point, this analysis found that party competition between state-
wide parties and nationalist regional parties is not as relevant as assumed in 
the literature, at least for these specific cases.
It does not dismiss the public opinion factor. Incentives created by 
public opinion were evident in both cases to the extent that political parties, 
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both in the pro-independence and anti-independence camps, have 
significantly articulated the public opinion in pushing through 
accommodative and adversarial strategies. Further, it can assume that trends 
in public opinion will be an essential indicator of the prospects for the 
secessionist movements that continue today.
This research design has focused on three dimensions of party 
incentives—party system, party competition, and public opinion to explore 
the ruling party strategies as the independent variable. However, this 
parsimonious research design might have missed another critical variable 
that is potentially relevant—ideational variable. As Cetrà and Harvey (2018) 
discussed the conception of the state and nations significantly differ in Spain 
and the UK. The Spanish constitution declares that the ‘Spanish people’ are 
the subject of ‘sovereignty’ from whom ‘all powers of state organs’
allegedly emanate and ambiguously states about the recognition of minority 
nations, which is the same reasoning used in the Spanish government’s 
argument against the right to self-determination. In the meantime, unionism 
as a political doctrine and ideology pervaded the UK’s political and social 
landscape. Indeed, this is an important variable, but lacking this variable 
does not hurt my theoretical framework and arguments that follow through.
By focusing on the party dynamics and the strategic behavior of the 
parties, this analysis, therefore, confirms the statement that a secession is a 
rare event in democracies. Because the party system, party competition, and 
public opinion interlocked together must create a ‘working condition’ for a 
ruling party at the right time to decide to accommodate the territorial 




고주현. 2018. “스페인 카탈루냐 지역 분리 독립과 인정의 정치.” 『 유럽연
구 』 제36권 3호, 75-110.
English Literature
Aragonès, E. and Ponsatí, C. (2016) “Negotiations and political strategies in 
the contest for Catalan independence,” in Cuadras-Morató, X., eds., 
Catalonia: A New Independent State in Europe?: A debate on secession 
within the European Union. New York: Routledge, pp.107-148.
Armstrong, A, and M. Ebell. 2014. “The economics of Scottish 
independence: introduction.” National Institute Economic Review, 227.
Arrighi, J (2019) “‘The People, Year Zero’: Secessionism and Citizenship in 
Scotland and Catalonia.” Ethnopolitics, 18(3), pp. 278-97.
Balfour, S. and Quiroga, A. (2007) The Reinvention of Spain: Nation and 
Identity since Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Beach, D. and Pedersen, R. B. (2013) Process-Tracing Methods: 
Foundations and Guidelines. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Bossacoma, P. and López Bofill, H. (2016) “The secession of Catalonia: 
Legal strategies and barriers,” in Cuadras-Morató, X., eds., Catalonia: A 
New Independent State in Europe?: A debate on secession within the 
European Union. New York: Routledge, pp.107-148.
Bradbury, J. (2006) “British political parties and devolution: adapting to 
multi-level politics in Scotland and Wales,” in Hough, D. and Charlie, J., 
eds., Devolution and electoral politics. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press.
Burg, S, L. (2015) “Identity, Grievances, and Popular Mobilization for 
Independence in Catalonia,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 21(3), 
pp.289-312.
Caramani, D. (2005) “The formation of national party systems in Europe: a 
comparative-historical analysis.” Scandinavian Political Studies, 28(4), 
pp. 295–322.
Castells, A. 2014. “Catalonia and Spain at the crossroads: financial and 
economic aspects.” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 30(2), pp.277-
96.
Cetrà, D. and Harvey, M. (2018) “Explaining accommodation and resistance 
to demands for independence referendums in the UK and Spain.” 
Nations and Nationalism, •• (••), pp. 1-23.
76
Curtice, J. (2016) “From Indyref1 to Indyref2?: The State of Nationalism in 
Scotland.” Scottish Social Attitudes, Edinburgh: ScotCen Social 
Research. [online] available at: http:// 
www .ssa.natcen.ac.uk/media/38917/ssa-2016-state-of-nationalism.pdf
Dardanelli, P. (2005) Between Two Unions: Europeanisation and Scottish 
Devolution. (Manchester: Manchester University Press).
Dekavalla, M. (2016) “Framing referendum campaigns: the 2014 Scottish 
independence referendum in the press.” Media, Culture & Society, 38(6), 
pp. 793-810.
Deschouwer, K. (2003) “Political parties in multi-layered systems.” 
European Urban and Regional Studies, 10(3), pp.213-26. 
Detterbeck, K. and Hepburn, E. (2010) “Party politics in multi-level 
systems: party responses to new challenges in European democracies,” 
in Erk, J. and Swenden, W., eds., New Directions in Federalism Studies. 
London: Routledge, pp. 106–125.
De Winter, L. and Türsan, H. eds., (1998) Regionalist parties in Western 
Europe. London: Routledge.
Dion, S. (1996) "Why is Secession Difficult in Well-Established 
Democracies? Lessons from Quebec." British Journal of Political 
Science, 26(2), pp. 269-83.
Downs, A. (1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper & 
Row. 
Elias, A. (2015) “Catalan Independence and the Challenge of Credibility: 
The Causes and Consequences of Catalan Nationalist Parties’ Strategic 
Behavior.” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 21(1), pp. 83-103. 
Elias, A. and Mees, L. (2017) “Between accommodation and secession: 
Explaining the shifting territorial goals of nationalist parties in the 
Basque Country and Catalonia.” Revista d'Estudis Autonòmics i 
Federals, 2017(23), pp. 129-65.
Equipo de Sociologica Electoral (1980) “Las elecciones parlamentarias 
catalanas del 20 de marzo de 1980,” Revista Española de Política, 14 
(1980), 195–219.
Acord X legislature—acord per a la transició national i per grantir 
l’estabilitat parlamentària del Goven de Catalunya’ between CiU and 
ERC, 12 December, quoted in Guirao, F. (2016) “Catalonia in the EU? 
Terra Ignota” in Cuadras-Morató, X., eds., Catalonia: A New 
Independent State in Europe?: A debate on secession within the 
European Union. New York: Routledge, pp. 189-223.
Fabre, E. (2008) “Party Organization in a Multi-level System: Party 
77
Organizational Change in Spain and the UK.” Regional and Federal 
Studies, 18(4), pp.309-29.
Fabre, E. and Martínez-Herrera, E. (2009) “Statewide Parties and Regional 
Party Competition: An Analysis of Party Manifestos in the United 
Kingdom,” in Swenden, W. and Maddens, B. eds., Territorial Party 
Politics in Western Europe. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 229-49. 
Fabre, E. and Swenden, W. (2013) “Territorial Politics and the Statewide 
Party.” Regional Studies, 47(3), pp. 342-55. 
Gómez-Reino, M. (2008), A Niche or an Expanding Universe for 
Ethnoregionalist Parties in Europe? Party Demands in Contemporary 
European Politics. Paper presented at the conference ‘European 
Identities: Nationalism, Regionalism and Religion’, University of Notre 
Dame, London center, 17–18 October.
Goven de Catalunya (2012) Acord X legislature—acord per a la transició 
national i per grantir l’estabilitat parlamentària del Goven de Catalunya’ 
between CiU and ERC, 12 December, quoted in Guirao, F. (2016) 
“Catalonia in the EU? Terra Ignota” in Cuadras-Morató, X., eds., 
Catalonia: A New Independent State in Europe?: A debate on secession 
within the European Union. New York: Routledge, pp.
Griffiths, R., P. G. Álvarez, and F. Martinez i Coma (2015) “Between the 
Sword and the Wall: Spain’s Limited Options for Catalan 
Secessionism.” Nations and Nationalism, 21(1).
Guibernau, M. (1999) Nations without States: Political Communities in a 
Global Age. Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers.
___________, (2004) Catalan Nationalism: Francoism, Transition, and 
Democracy. London: Routledge. 
___________. (2006) “National identity, devolution and secession in 
Canada, Britain and Spain,” Nations and Nationalism, 12(1), pp.51-76.
___________. (2013) “Secessionism in Catalonia: After Democracy.” 
Ethnopolitics, 12(4), pp.368-393.
___________. (2014) “Prospects for an Independent Catalonia.” 
International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, 27, pp. 5–23.
Guibernau, M., Rocher, F. and E. C. Adam. 2014. “Introduction: A Special 
Section on Self-Determination and the Use of Referendums: Catalonia, 
Quebec and Scotland.” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and 
Society, 27, pp. 1–3.
Guirao, F. (2016) “An independent Catalonia as a member state of the 
European Union? Terra Ignota,” in Cuadras-Morató, X., eds., 
Catalonia: A New Independent State in Europe?: A debate on secession 
78
within the European Union. New York: Routledge, pp.189-223.
Hale, H. 2008. The Foundations of Ethnic Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Hepburn, E. (2009) “Introduction: Re-conceptualizing Sub-state 
Mobilization.” Regional and Federal Studies, 19(4-5), pp. 477-99. 
HM Government (1998) Scotland Act 1998, London, [online] available at: 
http:// www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/46/schedules/enacted 
[Accessed 20 June 2019]
_______________ (2012) Scotland’s constitutional future: Responses to the 




_______________ (2013) Scotland Analysis: Devolution and the 
Implications of Scottish Independence, Cm. 8554, London: The 
Stationery Office.
_______________ (2016) Scotland Act 2016, London, [online] available at: 
http:// www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2016/11/contents/enacted 
[Accessed 20 June 2019]
HM Government and Scottish Government (2012) Agreement between the 
United Kingdom Government and the Scottish Government on a 
referendum on independence for Scotland. Edinburgh: Author.
Hopkin, J. and Bradbury, J. (2006) “British statewide parties and multilevel 
politics.” Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 36(1), pp.135-52.
Johns, R., Mitchell, J., Denver, D. and Pattie, C. (2009) “Valence Politics in 
Scotland: Towards an Explanation of the 2007 Election.” Political 
Studies, 57, pp. 207-33.
Johns, R., Mitchell, J. and Carman, C. (2013) “Constitution or competence? 
The SNP’s re-election in 2011.” Political Studies 61(1), pp.158-78. 
Keating, M. (1996) Nations, Nationalism and the State. London: Palgrave 
Macmillan.
_________. (2001) Plurinational Democracy: Stateless Nations in a Post-
Sovereignty Era. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
_________. (2004) “European Integration and the Nationalities Question.” 
Politics & Society, 32(3), pp. 367-88. 
_________. (2008) “Thirty Years of Territorial Politics.” West European 
Politics, 31(1-2), pp. 60-81.
_________. (2009) The Independence of Scotland: Self-government and the 
Shifting Politics of Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
79
Keating, M. and McGarry, J. (eds) (2001) Minority nationalisms in the 
changing state order. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kidd, C. (2008) Union and Unionisms: Political Thought in Scotland, 1500-
2000. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kidd, C. and Petrie, M. (2016) “The Independence Referendum in 
Historical and Political Context,” in McHarg et al., eds., The Scottish 
Independence Referendum: Constitutional and Political Implications. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 29-52.
Kymlicka, W. and Norman, W. (2000) Citizenship in Culturally Divided 
Societies: Issues, Contexts, Concepts. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lane, L., McKay, D. and Newton, K. (1991) Data Handbook: OECD 
Countries. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Lecours, A. (2018) “The Political Consequences of Independence Referenda 
in Liberal Democracies: Quebec, Scotland, and Catalonia.” Polity, 50(2), 
pp. 243-74.
León, S. (2006) The Political Economy of Fiscal Decentralization: Bringing 
Politics to the Study of Intergovernmental Transfers. Madrid: Centro de 
Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales. 
Liñeira, R. and Cetrà, D. (2015) “The Independence Case in Comparative 
Perspective.” The Political Quarterly 86(2), pp. 257-64.
Lynch, P. (1996) Minority nationalism and European Integration. Cardiff: 
University of Wales Press. 
Martí, D. and Cetrà, D. (2016) “The 2015 Catalan election: a de facto
referendum on independence?” Regional and Federal Studies, 26(1), 
pp.107-19. 
Martí Tomàs, D. (2016) “Explaining Territorial Demands: Party
Competition as a Driver of Self-government Claims in Decentralised 
Stateless Nations.” (Published doctoral thesis). The University of 
Edinburgh.
Martínez-Herrera, E. and Miley, T. J. (2010) “The constitution and the 
politics of national identity in Spain,” Nations and Nationalism, 16(1), 
pp.6-30.
Meguid, B. (2008) Party competition between unequals: strategies and 
electoral fortunes in Western Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
________. (2009) “Institutional Change as Strategy: The Role of 




Mitchell, J. (2004) “Scotland, the Union State and the International 
Environment,” in Keating, M, and J. Loughlin, eds., The Political 
Economy of Regionalism. London: Frank Cass, pp. 406-21.
________. (2014) The Scottish Question. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
________. (2016) “The Referendum Campaign” in McHarg et al., eds., The 
Scottish Independence Referendum: Constitutional and Political 
Implications. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 75-100.
Morata, F. (2013) “Spain: The autonomic state,” in Loughlin, J, J. Kincaid, 
and W. Swenden, eds., Routledge Handbook of Regionalism and 
Federalism. New York: Routledge, pp.273-86.
Moreno, L (2001) The Federalization of Spain. London: Frank Cass. 
McGarvey, N. (2015) “The coalition beyond Westminster,” in Seldon, A. 
and Finn, M., eds., The Coalition Effect, 2010-2015. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 87-112. 
McHarg, A. (2016) “The Constitutional Case for Independence,” in McHarg, 
A., Mullen, T. J. and Page, A. C., eds., The Scottish Independence 
Referendum: Constitutional and Political Implications. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 101-26.
Moreno, L. and McEwen, N. eds., (2005) The Territorial Politics of Welfare. 
New York: Routledge, 
Muro, D. (2009) “Territorial Accommodation, Party Politics, and Statute 
Reform in Spain.” South European Society & Politics, 14(4), pp. 453-68.
O’Neill, K. (2003) “Decentralization as an Electoral Strategy.” Comparative 
Political Studies, 36(9), pp. 1068-1091.
Orriols, L. and Cordero, G. (2016) “The Breakdown of the Spanish Two-
Party System: The Upsurge of Podemos and Ciudadanos in the 2015 
General Election.” South European Society and Politics, 21(4), pp. 469-
492.
Parlament de Catalunya (2013) Resolution 5/X of the Parliament of 
Catalonia, adopting the Declaration of sovereignty and right to decide 
of the people of Catalonia. Jan 24. [online] available at: 
https://www.parlament.cat/ document/intrade/7176 [Accessed 29 June 
2019]
____________________ (2014) Resolution 479/X of the Parliament of 
Catalonia by which it was agreed to submit to the Presiding Board of 
Congress the draft organic act delegating to the Generalitat of Catalonia 
power to authorize, call and hold a referendum on the political future of 
Catalonia. Jan 16. [online] available at: 
https://www.parlament.cat/document/ intrade/23112 [Accessed 1 July 
81
2019]
Paterson, L. (2006) “Sources of Support for the SNP,” in Bromley, C., 
Curtice, J., Hinds, K. and Park, A. eds., Has Devolution Delivered?. 
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 46–70.
Paterson, L., Brown, A., Curtice, J., Hinds, K., McCrone, D., Park, A., 
Sproston, K. and Surridge, P. (2001) New Scotland, New Politics?
Edinburgh: Polygon.
Przeworksi, A. and Sprague, J. (1986) Paper Stones: A History of Electoral 
Socialism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Przeworski, A. and Teune, H. 1970. "Research Designs." In The Logic of 
Comparative Social Inquiry. New York: Wiley-Interscience.
Requejo, F. (2013) “National Pluralism, Recognition, Federalism and 
Secession (or Hegel Was a Clever Guy),” in Gagnon, A-G., Keil, S. and 
Mueller, S. eds., Understanding Federalism and Federation. Burlington: 
Ashgate Publishing. 
Rico, F and R. Liñeira. (2014) “Bringing Secessionism into the Mainstream: 
The 2012 Regional Election in Catalonia.” South European Society and 
Politics, 19(2), pp. 257-280.
Rokkan, S, and D. Urwin (1983) Economy, Territory, Identity: Politics of 
West European Peripheries. London: Sage Publication.
Sartori, G. (1976) Parties and Party systems: A Framework for Analysis. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Scottish Government (2007) Choosing Scotland’s Future: A National 
Conversation: Independence and Responsibility in the Modern World
(Edinburgh: Scottish Government).
__________________ (2013) Scotland’s Future. Your Guide to an 
Independent Scotland (Edinburgh: Scottish Government).
__________________ (2016a) Scotland’s Place in Europe (Edinburgh: 
Scottish Government).
__________________ (2016b) Export Statistics Scotland - 2017, [online] 
available at: http:// www. gov. scot/Topics/Statistics/Browse/Economy/
Exports/ESSPublication [Accessed 19 June 2019]
Scottish National Party (2016) Re-elect. [online] available at: https://
d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/thesnp/pages/5540/attachments/original
/1485880018/SNP_Manifesto2016-web_(1).pdf? 1485880018
Serrano, I. (2013) “Just a Matter of Identity? Support for Independence in 
Catalonia.” Regional & Federal Studies, 23(5), pp. 523-45.
Smout, T.C. (1994) “Perspectives on the Scottish identity.” Scottish Affairs, 
26(1), Edinburgh: Unit for Study of Government in Scotland.
82
Sorens, J. (2009) “The Partisan Logic of Decentralization in Europe.” 
Regional & Federal Studies, 19(2), pp. 255-72. 
Strøm, K. (1990) “A Behavioral Theory of Competitive Political Parties.”
American Journal of Political Science, 34(2), pp. 565–98.
Swenden, W. (2006) Federalism and Regionalism in Western Europe: A 
Comparative and Thematic Analysis. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Tickell, A. (2016) “The Technical Jekyll and the Political Hyde: The 
Constitutional Law and Politics of Scotland’s Independence 
‘Neverendum,’” in McHarg et al., eds., The Scottish Independence 
Referendum: Constitutional and Political Implications. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 326-46.
Toubeau, S. (2011) “Regional Nationalist Parties and Constitutional Change 
in Parliamentary Democracies: A Framework for Analysis.” Regional & 
Federal Studies, 21(4-5), pp. 427-46. 
Toubeau, S. and Massetti, E. (2013) “The Party Politics of Territorial 
Reforms in Europe.” West European Politics, 36(2), pp. 297-316.
Turp, D. (2017) “CATALONIA’S ‘RIGHT TO DECIDE’ UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL, EUROPEAN, SPANISH, CATALAN AND 
COMPARATIVE LAW,” in Turp, D., Caspersen, N., Qvorturp, M. and 
Welp, Y. The Catalan Independence referendum: An assessment of the 
process of self-determination. Montreal: IRAI.
Vintro, J. (2012) “LEGALITY AND THE REFERENDUM ON 
INDEPENDENCE IN CATALONIA” Oct 23. [online] available at: 
http://idpbarcelona.net/legalidad-y-consulta-soberanista-en-cataluna/
Newspaper/journal Articles
BBC (2015) “Election 2015: SNP wins 56 of 59 seats in Scots landslide.” 
May 8. [online] available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/election-2015-
scotland-32635871 [Accessed 20 June 2019]
Catalan News (2012) “The CiU proposes an independent Catalan state 
within the EU by 2020.” Oct 29. [online] available at: 
http://www.catalannews. com/politics/item/the-ciu-proposes-an-
independent-catalan-state-within-the-eu-by-2020 [Accessed 30 May 
2019]
El Pais (2013) “Catalan parties attempt to harness Constitution for status 
vote drive.” Nov 12. [online] available at: 
https://elpais.com/elpais/2013/11/12/ inenglish/1384249 999_680773. 
html [Accessed 1 July 2019]
The Guardian (2014) “UK party leaders issue joint pledge to give Scottish 
83
parliament new powers.” [online] available at: https://www.theguardian.
com/politics/2014/sep/ 16/cameron -miliband-clegg-pledge-daily-record 
[Accessed 25 June 2019]
___________ (2017) “Beyond Catalonia: pro-independence movements in 
Europe.” Oct 27. [online] available at: https://www.theguardian.com/
world/ng-interactive/2017/oct/27/beyond-catalonia-pro-independence-
move ments-in-europe-map [Accessed 12 October 2018]
Politico (2015) “The disobedient province: Pro-independence parties rally 
for an ‘unstoppable’ majority in Catalonia.” Sep 24. [online] available 
at: https://www.politico.eu/article/disobedient-province-catalan-
independent-protest-autonomy-spain-politics/ [Accessed 20 May 2019]
______ (2019) “Sturgeon: Brexit should trigger Scottish independence vote 
by 2021.” Apr 24. [online] available at: 
https://www.politico.eu/article/nicola-sturgeon-brexit-should-trigger-
scottish-independence-vote-by-2021/ [Accessed 20 May 2019]
Reuters (2012) “Spain’s Catalonia region to hold early elections on Nov 
25.” Sep 25. [online] available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/spain-
catalonia-elections/spains-catalonia-region-to-hold-early-elections-on-
nov-25-idUSE8E8GI01L20120925
______ (2019) “Catalan leaders go on trial in Madrid over independence 
bid.” Feb 11. [online] available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
spain-politics-catalonia/catalan-leaders-go-on-trial-in-madrid-over-
independence-bid-idUSKCN1Q01LD [Accessed 29 June 2019]
The Telegraph (2002) “Scotland ‘must have voice on Iraq war’” Oct 10. 
[online] available at: 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1409685/Scotland-must-
have-voice-on-Iraq-war.html [Accessed 10 May 2019] 
84
국문초록
카탈루냐와 스코틀랜드의 분리주의 정당은 수 년간 자기 지역의
분리독립을 위해 노력해왔다. 그 결과 두 지역 모두 분리독립에 관한 국
민투표를 실시하는 데까지는 성공하지만, 결과적으로 독립에 실패하고
만다. 그런데 두 지역의 분리독립 시도가 좌절되기까지의 과정에는 매우
흥미로운 차이가 존재했다. 그 차이는 분리독립 시도에 대한 중앙정부들
의 대응이었다. 기본적으로 카탈루냐 지역정부와 스코틀랜드 지역정부
모두 국민투표를 시행할 권한을 갖고 있지 않았다. 우선 카탈루냐 지역
정부는 국민투표 시행 권한을 이전해줄 것을 스페인 중앙정부에 요구했
으나 거부 당했다. 이에 카탈루냐 지역정부는 2014년, 2017년에 국민투
표를 강행 했는데, 스페인 중앙정부는 이를 위헌이라고 비난하며 매우
강경한 태도로 대응했다. 이에 비해 스코틀랜드의 분리독립 시도에 대한
영국 중앙정부의 태도는 매우 온건한 것이었다. 영국 중앙정부는 스코틀
랜드 정부가 합법적으로 국민투표를 시행할 수 있도록 법적인 근거를 마
련해줌으로써 평화적으로 국민투표가 실시되도록 했다. 즉, 두 지역 모
두 분리독립을 위한 국민투표를 시도했다가 실패했다는 점에서는 동일했
지만, 그 과정에서 나타난 중앙정부의 대응은 매우 상이한 것이었다.
무엇이 이런 차이를 초래했을까? 무엇이 두 중앙정부로 하여금
분리독립에 대해 상이한 태도를 취하게 만들었을까? 본 연구는 ‘정당전
략’이 그 원인이라고 주장한다. 두 지역에서 국민투표 추진부터 시행 이
후까지의 정당행태에 초점을 맞추어 살펴보면, 집권당과 정당 엘리트들
이 득표 극대화라는 자신들의 합리적 목표 달성을 위해 전략적으로 행동
하는 것을 발견할 수 있다. 즉, 집권당과 정당 엘리트들은 이후 선거에
서 유권자 득표를 극대화하고 유지하기 위해 분리독립이라는 독립 투표
85
이슈를 이용한다는 것이다. 본 논문은 두 사례의 분리독립 시도와 과정
을 비교 관점에서 두텁게 기술한다. 이를 통해 ‘정당전략’이 두 사례에서
중앙정부 대응의 차이를 불러온 주요한 원인이었다는 점을 증명한다.
주요어: 독립 투표, 분리독립, 정당전략, 카탈루냐, 스코틀랜드, 영토정치
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